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CORPORATE DIVIDENDS AND OTHER NON-
LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTIONS IN CASH.
PROPERTY. STOCK. AND OBLIGATIONS
BORIS I. BITTKER.
A. DISTRmUTIONS IN CASH
UNDER the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the corporation is a
separate taxable entity, so that corporate income is taxed to the
corporation and dividends paid by the corporation are taxable to the
shareholders. The framework for the taxation of corporate distri-
butions is provided by Sections 301 (a), 301 (c), and 316 of the Code.
By virtue of these provisions, a corporate distribution is a "dividend"
that must be included in gross income under § 301 (c) (1) and
§ 61 (a) (7) if, and to the extent that, it comes out of "earnings and
profits" of the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913 or out
of earnings and profits of the taxable year. Most distributions of most
corporations fall well within this category of taxable Hdividends" and
hence are taxed as ordinary income to the shareholder, subject to the
$50 exclusion of § 116 and the 4 percent dividends received credit of
§ 34 if the shareholder is an individual or to the 85 percent dividends
received deduction of § 243 if the shareholder is a corporation. To
the extent that a distribution by a corporation is not covered by cur-
rent or post-1913 earnings and profits, however, it is treated by
§ 301(c)(2) as a return of capital to the shareholder, to be applied
against and in reduction of the adjusted basis of his stock. If the
distribution exceeds the adjusted basis of the stock, the excess is
ordinarily taxed as capital gain, with an exception of minor importance
for distributions out of increase in the value of corporate property
accrued before March 1, 1913.1
If we assume a corporation newly organized for cash, the reason
for gearing the taxability of its distributions to its record of earnings
and profits is clear enough. Until the corporation has engaged in
profitable operations, any distribution to its original stockholders is
a return of their investment rather than income. Once the corporation
has realized profits, on the other hand, its distributions may pro tanto
be fairly regarded as income to the stockholders.
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
This article is adapted (and reprinted by permission of the author) from a chapter
of a book, designed to serve as a guide or handbook to the problems of Subchapter C
of the Internal Revenue Code (the organization and capital structure of corporations,
distributions in cash and property, stock dividends, stock redemptions and partial liqui-
dations, preferred stock bail-outs, complete liquidations, collapsible corporations, divisive
reorganizations, and mergers, consolidations, and other acquisitions).
1 § 301(c)(3)(A) and (B).
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The equity of § 316 and § 301 (c) is far less clear if we assume
that after a period of corporate profits the stock changes hands and
that before additional earnings arise (the next day, if you will) there
is a distribution to the new stockholder. Has not he received a return
of his capital? The economist might say that a distribution in these
circumstances ought to be regarded as a return of capital, but § 301 (c)
and § 316 of the Internal Revenue Code are inescapable, so that to
the extent of his share of the corporation's earnings and profits, the
surprised stockholder has realized income. This "miracle of income
without gain"-the phrase is from Powell, "Income from Corporate
Dividends,ll2-long ago was attested by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Phellis: 3
Where, as in this case, the dividend constitutes a distribution of
profits accumulated during an extended period and bears a large pro-
portion to the par value of the stock, if an investor happened to buy
stock shortly before the dividend, paying a price enhanced by an esti-
mate of the capital plus the surplus of the company, and after distribu-
tion of the surplus, with corresponding reduction in the intrinsic and
market value of the shares, he were called upon to pay a tax upon the
dividend received, it might look in his case like a tax upon his capital.
But it is only apparently so. In buying at a price that reflected the
. accumulated profits, he of course acquired as a part of the valuable
rights purchased the prospect of a dividend from the accumulations-
bought "dividend on," as the phrase goes-and necessarily took subject
to the burden of the income tax proper to be assessed against him by
reason of the dividend if and when made. He simply stepped into the
shoes, in this as in other respects, of the stockholder whose shares he
acquired, and presumably the prospect of a dividend influenced the
price paid, and was discounted by the prospect of an income tax to be
paid thereon.4
In point of fact, however, the purchaser of stock must bid against
many other potential buyers, who would be affected in varying degrees
by the income tax on a dividend and some of whom may be tax exempt
organizations, so that the price could rarely if ever be accurately
"discounted by the prospect of an income tax to be paid" on dividends
that may be declared immediately after the stock is purchased. More-
over, the distribution will be a "dividend" under § 316 only if it is paid
from the corporation's earnings and profits, and since the calculation
of earnings and profits may be a complex operation,!; the purchaser
would not know t~e proper discount to apply (except possibly in the
case of a closely-held corporation) even if he were so foresighted as
to anticipate the problem.
2 35 Harv. L. Rev. 363 (1922).
3 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
4 257 U.S. at 171-2.
I> Infra, p. 56.
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Just as the concept of earnings and profits may be unfair to a
shareholder who buys stock before a corporate distribution, so on
occasion it may with equal irrationality shower him with riches. If
the corporation into which he buys is a deficit corporation, distribu-
tions by the corporation may be treated as wholly or partly tax-free
returns of capital to the shareholder even though they reflect earnings
after he buys his stock.. This bonanza can occur if the corporati<m
has neither post-1913 nor current earnings and profits; and if (to
reverse the "discount" theory of the Phellis case) the shareholder
did not pay a premium when he bought his shares for the tax advan-
tage lurking in the corporation's deficit.
The inequities of relating the tax status of corporate distributions
to the corporation's earnings and profits grow out of the felt need for
a method of protecting returns of capital from the tax on dividends;
and while a better response to this need could no doubt be devised,6
Congress has shown no disposition to depart from the present method.7
Before turning to the details of the general rule set out above,
under which a distribution by a corporation isa "dividend" if it comes
out of current or post-1913 earnings and profits and a return of capital
to the extent that it exceeds the earnings and profits, it should be
noted that special rules are provided for certain categories of distri-
butions, among which are:
1. Distributions in kind, i.e., of property other than money.8
2. Distributions ofthe distributing corporation's own obligations.9
3. Distributions of the corporation's own stock or of rights to
purchase its stock.1o
4. Distributions in redemption of stock, including partial liquida-
tions and complete liquidations.
5. Distributions in corporate organizations, reorganizations and
similar transactions.
Constructive or disguised distributions. The rules of § 301(c)
(under which corporate distributions are to be treated as "dividends"
or returns of capital, depending'on the amount of the corporation's
current and post-1913 earnings and profits) corne into play only if a
6 Without attempting to work out the details, one approach would be to treat all
receipts from the corporation as taxable income, and to compute the shareholder's gain or
loss on his capital inve$tment when he sells or otherwise disposes of his shares or when
they become worthless. Another method of taxing the shareholder would be to apply all
distributions against ba$is until his cost was recouped, taxing all subsequent distributions
or receipts as ordinary income, capital gain, or a combination thereof.
7 See Andrews, "Out of Its Earnings and Profits": Some Reflections on the Taxation
of Dividends, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1403 (1956); Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau, and Warren, A
Technical Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corporate _Distributions to
Sharebolders, 52 Col. L. Rev. 1, &-'8 (1952).
8 Infra, p. 64.
9 Infra, p. 78.
10 Infra, p. 80.
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corporation makes a "distribution ... to a shareholder .with respect
to its stock."l! According to the Regulations, § 301 "is not applicable
to an amount paid by a corporation to a shareholder unless the amount
is paid to the shareholder in his capacity as such."l2 Thus, if a corpo-
ration distributes property to a shareholder who is also a creditor of
the corporation in satisfaction of his claim, the distribution is not
governed by § 301. This example is given by the Senate Report on the
1954 Code;13 other examples would be a distribution to a shareholder-
employee as compensation for services or to a shareholder-vendor as
payment for property. Even if such transfers are regarded as "distri-
butions,"14 they are not made to a shareholder "with respect to [his]
stock," as required by § 301(a), and hence their tax consequences
are governed by other sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
A distribution to a shareholder in his capacity as such, however,
is subject to § 301 even though it is not declared in a formal fashion.
Informal, constructive, and disguised distributions are commonly en-
countered in the case of closely-held corporations. Although publicly-
held corporations rarely engage in the practice, some railroad and
public utility corporations are parties to leases requiring the lessee to
pay a fixed annual amount directly to the lessor's shareholders, an
arrangement that is the equivalent of a payment of rent to the lessor,
followed by a "distribution" by the lessor corporation.15 Informal
distributions may assume many forms, of which the most important
are the following:
1. "Loans" by a corporation to its stockholders that are not
intended to be repaid.16
2. Corporate "expenses" that are incurred to b,enefit stock-
holders, rather than to further the corporation's trade or business.
This category of informal distributions ranges from borderline ex-
penses (e.g., for travel and entertainment), where an allocation be-
tween the individual and the corporation may be in order, to the
blatant payment of personal expenses in an aura of fraudP In Amer-
11 § 301(a).
12 Regs. § 1.301-1 (c).
13 S. Rept. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 231.
14 The label seems inappropriate if the consideration received by the corporation is
equal to the value of the stock transferred, despite Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63
(1937) ("a sale of corporate assets to stockholders is, in a literal sense, a distribution
of its property").
15 See United States v. Joliet & Chicago R. Co., 315 U.S. 44 (1942); Commissioner
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 141 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 751.
16 See Regensburg v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 41 (2d CiT. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 783; Baird v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 387 (1955); White v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.
1562 (1952) (Acq.); Werner, Stockholder Withdrawals-Loans or Dividends? 10 Tax L.
Rev. 569 (1955).
17 E.g., see Lash v. Commissioner, IT 56,087 P-H Memo TC, aff'd per curiam, 245
F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1957).
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ican Properties, 1m:;. v. Commissioner/8 it was held that the expenses
of designing, constructing and racing speed boats, paid by a one-man
corporation, were not deductible under § 162 (a) by the corporation
and constituted disguised dividends to the sole shareholder who "had
an insatiable desire for speed.1H9 In Casale v. Commissioner/o how-
ever, it was held that premiums on a policy insuring the life of the
corporation's sole stockholder were not constructive dividend~ to him,
reversing a Tax Court judgment based on the theory that the corpo-
ration "was no more than a conduit running from the insurer to [the
stockholder], or his beneficiaries, with respect to any payments which
might come due under the insurance contract."2l
3. Sales of corporate property for less than fair market value.22
Although the applicable regulations state flatly that a transfer of prop-
erty for less than its fair market value is ipso facto a distribution, it
may also be necessary that the "spread" be substantial or that the
transaction be intended as a distribution.23 The Palmer case also holds
that the grant to shareholders of options to purchase corporate prop-
erty is not a taxable distribution, even though the options have a mar-
ket value; but it is not entirely clear that this principle would be
applied if there were a subtantial "spread" between the option price
and the value of the optioned property when the options were dis-
tributed.
4. AUowing shareholders to use corporate property without
paying a fair rent. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that any
"spread" between the amount paid by the shareholders and the fair
rental value of the property is a distribution subject to § 301. This
theory imposes an arm's length relationship on the shareholders and
their corporation (as provided by Regs. § 1.301-1(j) in the case of
bargain sales of corporate property).24 But on occasion the deficiency
18 28 T.C. 1100 (1957), affm'd. per curiam, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1958).
19 See also Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) (corporation's
payments for creating and maintaining "a unique horticultural show place" at sole
shareholder's farm disallowed under § 162(a) and taxed as constructive dividends).
20 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
21 Accord: Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st eir. 1957); Saunders v. Fox,
253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958). But see Sneed, A Defense of the Tax Court's Result in
Prunier and Casale, 43 Cornell L.Q. 339 (1958).
22 See Regs. § 1.301-1(j) (the calculation of the "amount" of the distribution if the
sbareholder is another corporation results from the specilll rule of § 301(b)(I)(B),
infra, p. 74); Timberlake v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1942); Young v.
Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1251 (1945).
23 See Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937).
Z~ Rev. Rul. 58-1, 1958-1 C.B. 173; 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner,
195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. j952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820; see also Dean v. Commissioner,
9 T.C. 256 (1947) (shareholders' use of corporation's riding horses not a constructive
distribution, where exercising them was beneficial to corporation).




is based on the corporation's out-of-pocket expenses, rather than on
the fair rental value of the property.25
5. Payments by a corporation to its shareholders, if excessive
in amount, in the form of rent, royalties, purchase price of prop.erty,
etc.26
6. Purported "salaries" paid to a stockholder or to the relative
or donee of a stockholder. Under § 162(a) the corporation is entitled
to deduct "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation
for personal services actually rendered." If no services are rendered,
the "salary" is a distribution to the stockholder who received it or
whose relative or donee received it. It is also often assumed that if
services are rendered but the compensation paid is excessive, the excess
should be treated as a distribution.27 It is arguable, however, that a
payment might exceed what is "reasonable" under § 162(a), without
thereby becoming a tldistribution" under § 301, and that "unreason-
able compensation" is taxable to the recipient as compensation rather
than as a distribution.28 On this theory, an alleged salary might be
allocated among the first two, or all three, of the following categories:
(a) compensation, deductible by the corporation under § 162 and tax-
able to the recipient as compensation; (b) unreasonable compensa-
tion, not deductible by the corporation under § 162 but taxable to the
recipient as compensation; and (c) distributions disguised as compen-
sation, not deductible by the corporation and taxable to the share-
holder (who is not necessarily the recipient) only under § 30l.
7. "Interest" on hybrid securities or on evidences of indebted-
ness issued by an under-capitalized corporation. So-called interest
has often been treated for tax purposes as dividends because paid
with respect to hybrid securities or evidences of indebtedness issued
by an under-capitalized corporation.29
8. Various fraudulent devices, such as diverting payments by
customers and others before they reach the corporation, collecting
"kick-backs" from the corporation's suppliers and employees, etc.30
25 See Lash v. Commissioner, n56,087 P-H Memo TC, aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d
20 (1st Cir. 1957) (80 percent of corporation's automobile expense treated as constructive
distribution to shareholder who made personal use of corporate vehicles). But see
Peacock v. Commissioner, 256 f.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1958) (rental value is a gift to the
shareholders in absence of evidence that it was intended as compensation for services).
26 See Byers v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952); Crabtree v. Commis-
sioner, 22 T.C. 61 (1954), aff'd per curiam, ZZI F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1955); Staab v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 834 (1953).
27 See Regs. § 1.162-8.
28 See Bone v. United States, 45 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Ga. 1931).
29 See John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946) (hybrid securities) ;
Dobkin v.Commissioner, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.
1951) (thin capitalization); Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34
Taxes 830 (1956).
30 Drybrough v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1956); Simon v. Commis-
sioner, 248 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1957); Myers v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 331 (1953).
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In the foregoing, it has been assumed that the payments in ques-
tion, not being what they purport to be, are "distributions" under
§ 301, with the tax consequences to the shareholder depending upon
the corporation's earnings and profits. "Unreasonable compensation,"
as indicate9 above, may be subject to different principles. There are
also several cases concerning the unlawful diversion of corporate funds
(category 8 above), in which it was held that the shareholders were
taxable under § 61 (a), without regard to the corporation's ea.rnings
and profits.sl These cases, which can be reconciled with § 301 only by
the unsatisfactory assumption that the funds were not taken by the
stockholders in their capacity as such, are inconsistent with later cases
in their own circuits;S2 moreover, nothing in the Hartman and Davis
opinions suggests why the unlawful diversion of corporate funds by
shareholders should be treated differently from the other forms of
informal or disguised distributions described above.
On the other hand, some of the payments described above '(e.g.,
loans; diversions; rent-free use of property) could be intended as
compensation rather than as distributions.s3
Finally, it should be noted that a payment is more likely to be
taxed as a constructive dividend if the stockholders share in it pro
rata, but equal treatment is not indispensable. In Lengsfield v. Com-
missioner,34 for example, distributions to several shareholders were
taxed as dividends; the others, who did not participate, were related
to the recipients and consented to the distributions.811
llDividend"-A Term oj Art. Under § 301(C), a distribution is
includible in the shareholder's gross income to the extent that it isa
"dividend," as defined in § 316; the balance of the distribution, if any,
is a return of capital under § 301 (c)( 2) and (3). The term "dividend"
as defined for income tax purposes by § 316(a) 'does not correspond
to the term "dividend" under state law, with the result that a corporate
For a more ,complete collection of cases on informal, disguised, and constructive
distributions, see Comment, Disguised Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey, 3 U.C.L.A.
Law Rev. 207 (1956); Toll, Constructive Dividends, 1951 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 211.
31 Hartman v. United States, 245 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1957); Davis v. United States,
226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 965.
82 Drybrough and Simon, supra, note 30.
33 Chandler v. Comnlissioner, 119 F.2Ud 623 (1941); see also Silverman v. Commis-
sioner, 253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958). The characterization of an amount received by
a shareholder may be important in determining whether (a) the corporation can deduct
it, (b) it reduces the corporation's earnings and profits in computing the taxability of
future distributions, (c) the recipient must treat it as ordinary income under § 61(a)
or may treat it in 'whole or in part as a return of capital under § 301(c), and (d)
the recipient is entitled to the dividends received credit of § 34 or to the dividends
nt.cived dedud.\l:lu I:l\ § ~4~.
34 241 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1957).
35 See also Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. C011lmissioner, 153 F.2d 602
(5th Cir. 1946).
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distribution may be a "dividend" under § 316 (a), although it impairs
capital or is otherwise unlawful under state law. Conversely, it is
possible for a distribution to constitute a lawful "dividend" under
state law without qualifying as a "dividend" under § 316 (a).86 In the
former instance, the "dividend" will ordinarily be taxable to the stock-
holder under the "claim of right" doctrine, notwithstanding his po-
tential liability to creditors under state law.87
The definition of "dividend" in § 316 is two-edged: a distribution
by a corporation to its shareholders is a "dividend" if it is made (1)
out of earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or
(2) out of earnings and profits of the taxable year. For present pur-
poses, earnings and profits of the current year can be regarded as
roughly synonymous with taxable income; accumulated post-1913
earnings and profits, as the sum of the earnings and profits since 1913,
less dividends paid in earlier years, or as the equivalent of earned
surplus. As will be seen in the next section, however, many adjust-
ments may be required to convert taxable income and earned surplus
into current and accumulated earnings and profits; and the definitions
lust suggested are only a stop-gap. It i5 perhaps unnec.essary to add
that none of these categories is represented by a bank account or
other specific corporate assets: a distribuHon is "out of" current
earnings and profits if the corporation enjoyed a profit in the taxable
year, and no "tracing" or "earmarking" of funds or assets is required.
The first part of § 316(a), providing that a distribution is a
"dividend" if it comes from earnings and profits accumulated since
February 28, 1913, looks to the financial success of the corporation
over the long haul. If it has been profitable since 1913 (or since
organization, if it was incorporated after 1913), distributions will be
taxed to the shareholders as "dividends." The exemption of earn-
ings and profits accumulated before February 28, 1913 (the date of
the first federal income ta~ imposed after the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment) is a matter of legislative grace, rather than constitu-
tional right.38 The exemption, however, affects only corporations
organized before 1913 andsuccessors of such corporations; and since
even a corporation that belongs to this select group is likely to keep
its distributions to shareholders well within its current or recent earn-
36 As Rudick, in the article cited infra, p. 55, has said (p. 886): " ... what the
distributing corporation may call a dividend, or what the state law may call a dividend,
or even what the recipient thinks of without question as a dividend, is not necessarily
a "dividend" for federal income tllX purposes." On state law, see Kreidroann, Dividends-
Changing Patterns, 57 Col. L. Rev. 372 (1957).
37 United States v. Lesoine, 203 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1953); but see Knight News-
papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1944).
38 Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.s. 339 (1918); see also Helvering v. Ganfield, 291 U.S.
163 (1934), holding that pre-1913 earnings and profits may be wiped out by post-1913
losses and need not be restored from later earnings.
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ings and profits, the complicated network of law built on the 1913
benchmark is of interest to very few shareholders. The Treasury
Department has made several assaults on the immunity of pre-1913
earnings and profits, but has not been able to persuade Congress to
repeal it.39
The second part of § 316(a) provides that a distribution is a
"dividend" if it comes from earnings and profits of the taxable year.40
Since most distributions are made by corporations that are currently
profitable, § 316(a)(2) often makes it unnecessary to compute the
corporation's post-1913 accumulated earnings and profits. This makes
for simplicity, but it also means that a distribution may be a taxable
"dividend" even though the corporation has a deficit; if the concept
of earnings and profits serves any useful purpose, it is partly under-
mined by § 316(a)(2). For the original shareholders of a corporation,
there is no economic difference between a distribution before the cor-
poration has had any earnings, which is not a "dividend" under either
§ 316 (a)( 1) or § 316 (a)( 2), and a distribution after it has suffered
a loss; but the latter is a "dividend" under § 316(a)(2) if there are
current earnings, even though they are insufficient to repair the deficit.
For shareholders who acquire their stock after the deficit but before
the earnings, to be sure, § 316(a) (2) is more defensible; but here
§ 316(a)( 2) does not go far enough, since its impact can be avoided
if the distribution can be postponed until a year in which the cor-
poration has no earnings and profits.
If the corporation has neither post-1913 accumulated earnings
and profits nor current earnings and profits, a distribution cannot be
a "dividend." It is, instead, subject to § 301(c)(2) and (3). Under
§ 301 (c) (2), the distribution is applied against and reduces the ad-
justed basis of the shareholder's stock. If the distribution exceeds in
amount the adjusted basis of the stock, the· excess is subject to
§ 301 (c)(3). It will be treated as gain from the sale or exchange of
property (and thus as capital gain if the stock is a capital asset),
39 See House Ways and Means Committee, 77th Cong., Zd sess., Hearings on Reve-
nue Revision of 1942, pp. 1692 ff.; H. Rept. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 418-9.
40 § 316(a) (2) has a curious ancestry. It was enacted in 1936 as a relief measure
when the undistributed profits tax was in effect. That tax was imposed on the undis-
tributed part of corporate income, computed by deducting "dividends" from total income.
Unless a deficit corporation could treat distributions out of current earnings as "divi-
dends" for this purpose, it would be unable to avoid the undistributed profits tax no
matter how large its distributions to stockholders were. To enable such corporations to
obtain a credit for "dividends" paid out of current earnings, § 316(a) (2) was enacted.
Apparently no thought was given to the effect of the new subsection apart from the
undistributed profits tax. Its impact can sometimes be avoided by postponing the
distribution un~ the next year. If the corporation has no earnings in that year and
still has a defiClt, the. distribution will be receivable tax-free since it will fall under
neither § 316(a)(1) nor § 316(a)(2).
HeinOnline -- 5 Howard L.J. 55 1959
January, 1959] CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 55
unless it is out of a pre-1913 increase in the value of the corporation's
property, in which event it will enjoy an exemption from taxY
The second sentence of § 316(a) lays down an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that every distribution is out of earnings and profits to the
extent thereof, and from the most recently accumulated earnings and
profits. This prevents "earmarking" a distribution to control its tax
status; e.g., a corporation having current earnings and profits, post-
1913 accumulated earnings and profits, and pre-1913 accumulated
earnings and profits, cannot make a distribution from the pre-1913
earnings and profits until the current and post-1913 earnings and
profits have been exhausted. Once current, post-1913, and pre-1913
earnings and profits have been exhausted, however, the corporation
may be able to ear-mark a distribution so as to give it the exemption
conferred by § 301(c)(3)(B) (pre-1913 increase in value) and
thus protect its shareholders against a capital gain tax under
§ 301(c)(3)(A).42
In determining whether a distribution is out of earnings and
profits of the taxable year, § 316(a)(2) provides that the earnings
and profits for the year are to be computed as of the close of the
taxable year without diminution by reason of distributions during the
year. This means that a distribution will be a "dividend" if the corpo-
ration has earnings and profits at the end of the taxable year, even
though it had none when the distribution occurred; contrariwise, a
distribution that appeared to be a lldividend" when made may turn
out to be a return of capital because the corporation has no earnings
and profits at the end of the year. If the distributions for the year
exceed in amount both the earnings and profits of the taxable year
and the post-1913 accumulated earnings and profits, the Regulations
prescribe a method of allocating the two categories of earnings and
profits to the various distributions in order to ascertain the "dividend"
component of each one.43
There are two landmark articles on earnings and profits, both
outdated at many points but still useful: Rudick, "Dividends" and
"Earnings or Profits" Under the Income Tax Law: Corporate Non-
Liquidating Distributions; 44 Paul, Ascertainment of "Earnings or
Profits" for the Purpose of Determining Taxability of Corporate
Distributions.45
41 See Higginson v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 254 (Ct. Cl. 1948), modified, 101
F. Supp. 763 (Ct. CI. 1952); Blauvelt v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 10 (1944) (Acq.). See
however § 34l(a)(3), for the tax treatment of a distribution in excess of basis by a
collapsible corporation.
42 For an example of the foregoing principles, see Regs. § 1.301-l(f), Example (1).
43 See Regs. § 1.316-2(b) and (1:).
44 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 865 (1941).
45 51 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1937), reprinted with revisions in Paul, Selected Problems
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Earnings and Profits. It is a curious fact that the Internal Rev-
enue Code, ordinarily so prodigal in the use of words, nowhere defines
the term "earnings and profits," although it has no counterpart in the
field of corporation law. The phrase entered the federal tax law in
1916, but until 1940 it was given meaning solely by judicial and admin-
istrative construction: In 1940, the effect of a few transactions upon
a corporation's "earnings and profits," was prescribed by statute, and
Congress has intervened several times since then, but a comprehensive
definition is still lacking!6 To compute the status of a corporation's
earnings and profits account is often no simple task, especially when
there has been a series of corporate reorganizations or other adjust-
ments. It may be necessary to go back many years to decide how a
transaction should have been treated under a now interred statute
because of its effect upon earnings and profits.
The computation of "earnings and profits" is not appreciably
simplified when we find that, in all probability, the term had little or
no meaning to the Congress that invented it. As already mentioned,
the phrase first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1916. The Re~enue
Act of 1913 had taxed "dividends" simpliciter, and by failing to define
the term. Congress apparently intended to adopt· its meaning in com-
mon parlance. The Treasury was quick to give it the broadest possible
meaning, including among other things distributions from surplus
accumulated before the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment. This
construction was upheld by the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Hornby:47
Hence we construe the provision of the act that "the net income of
a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from
* * * interest, rent, dividends, * * * or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever" as including . . . all dividends·
declared and paid in the ordinary course of business by a corporation
to its stockholders after the taking effect of the act (March 1, 1913),
whether from current earnings, or from accumula.ted surplus made up
in Federal Taxation (2d Ser., 1938) 149. The Rudick article is supplemented (to 1952)
by Albrecht, "Dividends" and "Earnings or Profits," 7 Tax. L. Rev. 157 (1952);
46 Because corporations ordinarily keep their distributions well under current earn-
ings and profits, it is rllIely necessary to ascertain the corporation's earnings and profits
with' precision, and many questions in the computation of earnings and profits are un-
answered for want of litigation. This lamentable obscurity was dispelled to some degree
by litigation under the excess profits taxes of World War II and the Korean War,
because the corporation's excess profits tax liability depended in part upon its invested
capital, which included earnings and profits, thus requiring an accurate determination
of the earnings and profits account for some corporations. A number of recent cases in
this field stem from fraud investigations: shareholders diverting corporate income in
large amounts (e.g., by pocketing the proceeds of cash sales) have litigated the question
whether their fraudulent diversions constituted dividend income under § 301 (c) (1),
returns of capital under § 301(c)(2), or capital gain under § 301(c)(3)(A).
The status of the corporation's earnings and profits account may have to be deter-
mined in applying various other provisions of the Code; e.g., § S~l (accumulated earn-
ings tax) ; § 333 (one-month liquidations).
47 247 U.S. 339 (1918).
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of past earnings or increase in value of corporate assets, notwithstanding
it accrued to the corporation in whole or in part prior to March 1, 1913.
In short, the word "dividends" was employed in the act as descriptive
of one kind of gain to the individual stockholder; dividends being
treated as the tangible and recurrent returns upon his stock, analogous
to the interest and rent received upon other forms of invested capita1.48
In the meantime, however, Congress had expressly provided in
the Revenue Act of 1916 that:
the term "dividends" as used in this title shan be held to mean any
distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation ... out of its
earnings or profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and
thirteen.49
It seems reasonably clear that the term "earnings or profits" crept
into the federal income tax law by accident when Congress was estab-
lishing March 1, 1913 as a dividing line between taxable distributions
and non-taxable distributions. In the first regulations issued under
the 1916 Act, the Treasury Department seemingly regarded "earnings
and profits" as identical with "surplus."50 It was inevitable, however,
that the existence of a corporate surplus could not serve to differen-
tiate between taxable and non-taxable distributions, unless the surplus
was first "adjusted" almost beyond recognition. For example, a distri-
bution of common stock by a corporation having only common stock
outstanding decreases its surplus, although it does not subject the
stockholders to tax;lIoa if surplus were the criterion of taxability, a
corporation could sweep its surplus account clean by a tax-free stock
dividend, and then distribute cash free of tax. This might be done
even if the distribution of cash would be improper under local law,
since in practice and often even by their terms state dividend statutes
penalize the stockholders or directors only if creditors are injured
by the distribution. Another deficiency in surplus as a criterion of
taxability is that it can be reduced by reserves for "contingencies";
if these were taken into account, the floodgates would be opened to a
stream of tax-free cash distributions for as long as the corporation's
directors could conjure up "contingencies" that would warrant the
creation of reserves. It is not surprising, therefore, that surplus has
been rejected as a criterion and that the term "earnings and profits"
has acquired a meaning more in keeping with its function.
When we search for the meaning of "earnings and profits," then,
we are in reality asking how a corporate transaction should affect the
stockholder who receives a distribution of cash or property from the
corporation after the transaction has occurred. To take a simple
illustration, assume that during the first year of a corporation's life
48 247 U.S. at 344.
49 39 Stat. 757 (1916).
110 Regs. 33 (revised), Arts. 106-7 (1918).
1I0a Infra, p. 80.
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it earns $10,000, pays a federal income tax of $3,000, and distributes
$8,000 to its shareholders. Ignoring other facts, it would probably be
agreed that $7,000 should be taxed to the shareholders as a dividend
and that the remaining $1,000 should be treated by them as a return
of capital.
Not all problems in the computation of earnings and profits, how-
ever, are solved so easily. Suppose, in the example just given, the
corporation's business earnings amounted to $10,000 but that in addi-
tion it had received $500 of tax-exempt interest on state and municipal
bonds. Should the $8,000 distribution to the stockholders be treated
as a dividend to the extent of $7,500, with only $500 being treated as
a return of capital? Or should the bond interest be excluded from earn-
ings and profits as well as from taxable income? One might argue that
the interest, which would not have been taxed to the shareholders had
they held the bonds in their personal capacities, should not become
taxable as income to them merely because it was filtered through the
corporate entity; despite this argument, the Regulations have long
taken the position that tax-exempt bond interest increases earnings
and profits, presumably on the theory that the corporation's capital
is not invaded by a distribution of such income.51 On the same theory,
apparently, the Regulations provide that depletion on mines and oil
and gas wells must be based on cost (or on March 1, 1913 value) in
computing earnings and profits, even though percentage depletion is
used in computing taxable income.52 Thus, if the corporation's earn-
ings are $10,000 computed with the benefit of percentage depletion,
but would have been $10,500 had depletion been based on cost, and if
federal income taxes are $3,000, a distribution of $8,000 would· be a
"dividend" to the e"tent of $7,500 and a return of capital to the extent
of only $500. Would the result in any of the foregoing cases be altered
if the corporation had created a revaluation surplus or deficit by writ-
ing the value 01 its asset'S> up or down to correspond with changes in
their market value? Although one might argue for taking such adjust-
ments into' account in computing earnings and profits, since the market
value rather than the cost of the corporation's assets is what realisti-
cally determines whether a distribution invades its capital or not, it is
reasonably clear that appreciation or depreciation in value that has
not been "realized" in the income tax sense does not affect earnings
and profits. A contrary rule would require the Treasury to appraise
the assets with each distribution or, at least, with each revaluation by
the directors.53
It should be apparent by now that a corporation's accumulated
51 Regs. ~ 1.:'>12-f>~p).
52 Regs. § 1.312-6(c).
53 See Commissioner v. Gross, 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956).
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earnings and profits are not necessarily equal to its surplus (despite
occasional loose use of the terms, even in tax cases, as interchangeable),
nor are they equal to total taxable income.54 There is, however, a dis-
tinct relationship between all three; starting with taxable income, for
example, one can derive both earnings and profits and surplus by going
through the corporation's books and records and adjusting for items
and transactions that are treated one way in computing taxable income
and another way in computing either earnings and profits or surplus.
By a similar process, with surplus as a starting point, one can derive
taxable income and earnings and profits; and with earnings and profits
as a base, taxable income and surplus can be computed. Indeed, the
corporation income tax return contains a schedule on which the tax-
payer reconciles his taxable net income with the increase or decrease
in surplus for the taxable year. (Form 1120, Schedule M-Reconcili-
ation of Taxable Income and Analysis of Earned Surplus and Un-
divided Profits.) In a similar manner, the increase or decrease in
earnings and profits for the same year should be computed.
Although earnings and profits can be derived by adjustments to
surplus, it. is more common to start with taxable income, and to the
extent that the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations define earn-
ings and profits, both ordinarily take taxable income as the point of
departure. The Regulations state, for example, that "the amount. of
earnings and profits in any case will be dependent upon the method
of accounting properly employed in computing taxable income," so
that if the corporation computes taxable income on the cash receipts
or disbursement basis, it may not use the accrual method for computing
earnings and profits.541l Without endeavoring to provide a compre-
54 See also Emmanuel, Earnings and Profits: An Accounting Concept? 4 Tax L.
Rev. 494 (1949).
54a Regs. § 1.312-6(a). This requirement of accounting consistency probably ap-
plies to such matters as the depreciation method selected under § 167(b) (see Koshland
v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 634 (1935)), the rapid amortization of emergency facilities
under § 168 (see I.T. 3543', 1942-1 C.B. 111) and of grain-storage facilities under § 169,
the accrual of charitable contributions under § 170(a) (2), the deduction of circulation,
research and experimental, and soil and water conservation expenditures under §§ 173-
175, and the amortization of organizational expenditures under § 248. See also Siegel
v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1289 (1934) (taxpayer computing taxable income by charging
of[ bad debts cannot use reserves for bad debts in computing earnings and profits).
As to items that are not taken into account in computing taxable income (e.g.,
federal income and excess profits taxes and fraud penalties), however, there is authority
for putting cash basis taxpayers on the accrual basis. Drybrough v. Commissioner, 238
F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1956); contra, Helvering v. Alworth Trust, 136 F.2d 812 (8tb Cir.
1943). See also Stein's Estate v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 940,965 (1956) (Acq.), bolding
that an accrual basis taxpayer's earnings and profits are to be reduced by its liability
for federal income taxes and fraud penalties even though contested in amount, a fact
that. ordinarily prevents an accrual of deductible taxes in computing taxable income
under Dixie Pine Products Co. 1/. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944); and Stark v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C. 122 (1957), allowing interest on disputed tax liabilities to be
deducted year by year in computing earnings and profits, altbougb tbe interest was
deductible in a later year in computing taxable income.
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hensive account of the computation of earnings and profits, it may be
said that the most important adjustments to convert taxable income
into earnings and profits fall into three categories:
1. Certain items excluded from taxable income must be included
in computing earnings and profits. Regs. § 1.312-6(b) states that:
Among the items entering into the computation of corporate earnings
and profits for a particular period are aU income exempted by statute,
income not taxable by the Federal Government under the Constitution, .
as well as all items includible in gross income under section 61 or
corresponding provisions of prior revenue acts.
In referring to "income not taxable by the Federal Government under
the Constitution," the Regulations no doubt meant interest on state
and municipal obligations (though the constitutional immunity of such
interest is far froIll clear), and the quoted extract is followed by an
explicit statement that such interest is taxable when distributed to
shareholders as dividends. The reference in the Regulations to "all
income exempted by statute" is ambiguous; taken in its broadest sense,
it would require all income items excluded from gross income by Part
III of Subchapter B to be included in earnings and profits."'''' As will
be seen, such a sweeping inclusion of these items cannot be accepted.
Although authority is scant, the leading commentators have
agreed with the Regulations in including in earnings and profits the
proceeds of life insurance exempt from taxable income under § 101(a),
interest on federal, state, and municipal obligations exempt under
§ 103, and compensation for injuries or sickness exempt under
§ 104(a). On the other hand, the commentators have thought that
gifts and bequests received by a corporation should be excluded from
"earnings and profits" as well as from taxable income, partly on the
theory that gifts and bequests cannot be "earned" and are not thought
of as "protits", partly on the theory that such gratuitous receipts are
55 Of the items in Part III, the following might be received by a corporation: life
insurance proceeds under § 10I(a); gifts and bequests under § 102; interest on certain
governmental obligations under § 103; compensation for injuries or sickness under § 104,
see Castner Garage, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 1 (1940) (Acq.); income from dis-
charge of indebtedness under § 108; the value of a lessee's iJnprovements on the lessor's
property under § 109; income taxes paid by a lessee corponltion under § 110; recovery
exclusions under § 111; the proceeds of certain sports programs under § 114 (but if
included in earnings and profits, § 114 proceeds would presumably be offset by a chari-
table contribution, even if in excess of the 5 percent limit of § 170); capital contributions
under § 118; and most of the items referred to by § 121.
Note that Regs. § 1.312-6(b) speaks of "all income exempted by statute," so that
the foregoing items are within its scope only if they constitute "intome." Hence, although
capital contributions arC excluded from gross income by § U8, the Regulations cannot
properly be construed to require their inclusion in earnings and profits., since the~ can
hardly be regarded as "income", at least not if made by shareholders pro rata. See
'Schweppe v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1224 (l947), aff'd per curiam, 168 F.2d 284 (9th
Cir. 1948).
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not income at all.56 The latter theory is not in conflict with the Regu-
lations (which speaks of "income" exempted by statute); but if such
receipts are "income" within the Constitution, the commentators' view
that the term "earnings and profits" was not intended by Congress to
embrace gifts and bequests conflicts with the long-standing Regulation.
There are, however, a number of items that are "exempted" from
taxable income by statute only in the limited sense tbat income is
recognized not at the outset of a transaction but at a later time. An
example is income from the discharge of the corporation's indebted-
ness; if the corporation e)Cercises its option under § 108 to exclude
such income when realized, it must reduce the basis of its assets so
that its profit will be reflected in taxable income when the assets are
depreciated or sold. The courts have held that earnings and profits are
not to be increased when the debt is cancelled, but only subsequently.57
This rule can be reconciled with Regs. § 1.312-6(b) by reading the
reference to income "exempted by statute" as embracing items that
are permanently excluded from income, but not items whose taxable
recognition is merely postponed. Similarly, a lessor corporation ought
not to be required to increase earnings and profits by the value oi
improvements made by its lessee when § 109 is applicable; taxable
income, and hence earnings and profits, will be greater in later years
because the basis of the property will not reflect the lessee's improve-
ments. On the other hand, Regs. § 1.312-6(b) probably requires an
amount excluded from taJtable income by virtue of the "recovery
exclusion" of § 111 to be included in earnings and profits; this seems
proper, at least if the bad debt or other item giving rise to the recovery
exclusion served· to reduce earnings and profits in an earlier year.
Similarly, if excessive depreciation was of no tax benefit, but reduced
earnings and profits, earnings and profits ought to be adjusted upward
when the property is sold, even though under § 1016(a)(2)(B) the
taxpayer is not required to report the recovery of useless excessive
depreciation as income.
2. Certain items deducted in computing tam-ble income may not
be deducted in computing earnings and profits. This category, as
56 Rudick, supra, at 882; Paul, supra, at 49; Albrecht, supra, at 186. Rev. RuI.
54-230, 1954-1 C.B. 114, states thllt the excess of life insurance proceeds (from a policy
insuring the life of a stockholder) over the aggregate premiums paid is includible in
earnings and profits. This would be appropriate if the premiums had not been deducted
from earnings and profits, but not otherwise. See infra, p. 62, suggesting that earnings
and profits should be reduced by the excess of premiums paid, but disallowed under
§ 264, over the cash surrender value of the policy. As to bequests, Diebold v. Commis-
sioner, If 53,052 P-H Memo TC, holds that they constitute contributions to capital and
do not increase earnings and profits.
57 Bangor & Aroostook R. Co. v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952) ; Alabama By-Products Corp. v. U.S., 228 F,2d 958 (5th Cir.
1956).
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described by Rudick,58 consists of "artificially created deductions or
credits which are allowed for purposes of computing taxable net in-
come, but which do not represent actual expenses or expenditures, i.e.,
there is no outlay by the corporation for the deductions or credits
represented by such items." As already mentioned, in computing
earnings and profits, depletion must be based on cost, even though
percentage depletion is employed in computing taxable income. Divi-
dends received from another corporation must be included in full in
computing the recipient corporation's earnings and profits, without
regard to the 85 percent deduction allowed by § 243 in computing
taxable income. The net operating loss deduction of § 172 cannot be
used to reduce earnings and' profits, since it is simply a carryback or
carryover of losses that reduced earnings and profits in the year they
occurred. The same is true of the capital loss carryover of § 1212.
3. Certain items that cannot be deducted in computing taxable
income may be deducted in computing earnings and profits. This
category, as described by Rudick,59 "consists of expenses and losses
which are not allowed as deductions in computing taxable net income,
but which dearly deplete the income available for distribution to the
stockholders." They must be deducted in computing earnings and
profits to prevent distributions of the corporation's capital from being
taxed as "dividends" to the stockholders. A clear example is the cor-
poration's income taxes; another, equally clear, is the dividends paid
in earlier years. Another example is the cost (expenses and interest)
of earning tax-exempt income; although § 265 provides that these out-
lays are not deductible in computing taxable income, they deplete the
fund available for distributions to stockholders, and the income to
which they are allocable is itself included in earnings and profits. The
Regulations, inferentially at least, allow the corporation, in computing
earnings and profits, to deduct losses, expenses, and interest on trans-
actions with controlling stockholders, as well as the excess of capital
loss over capital gain, although these items are not deductible60 in com-
puting taxable income.61 Unreasonable compensation (disallowed un-
der § 162), disallowed charitable contributions (in excess of the 5%
ceiling prescribed by § 170(b) (2) ), and the excess of life insurance
premiums paid, but disallowed as a deduction by § 264) over the cash
surrender value of the policy should probably also be deducted in
computing earnings and profits.62 Losses on "wash sales" at one time
were apparently deductible in computing earnings and profits, but
58 Supra, note 44 at 885.
59 Id. at 887.
60 §§ 267 and 1211.
61 Regs. § 1.312-7(b) (1), fourth sentence.
62 See the stipulated computation of earnings and profits in Stark v. Commissioner,
29 T.C. 122 (1957).
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§ 312(f)(1) now provides to the contrary, in recognition of the fact
that the losses will be taken into account in computing both taxable
income and earnings and profits at the time the investment is finally
closed out. Other losses on the sale or other disposition of property,
if unrecognized in computing taxable income, are to be similarly dis-
regarded in computing earnings and profits, since they will normally
be taken into account at a later date.63
Earnings and profits should probably also be adjusted for certain
other corporate outlays that are not deductible in computing taxable
income, such as lobbying expenses and political contributions; 64 there
is little reason to think that Congress would have wanted such items
to be disregarded in determining whether a distribution to stockholders
came out of earnings or capital. More doubtful, however, is the proper
treatment of expenses that are disallowed in computing taxable income
on grounds of public policy, such as fines, bribes, overceiling price
and wage payments, and the like, as well as contributions to organi-
zations engaged in "prohibited transactions" or subversive activities.65
Although these items might be classed with penalties for federal income
tax fraud, which have long been allowed by the Internal Revenue
Service itself as deductions in computing earnings and profits (though
with some quibbling about the proper year) ,66 the subject will have
to be reconsidered as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,67 Hoover Motor Express Co.,
Inc. v. United States,68 and Commissioner v. Sullivan.69 These cases
might be distinguished as resting on the "ordinary and necessary"
qualification of § 162; statutory language aside, the spirit of Sullivan
is hospitable, and that of Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. and Hoover Motor
Express Co., Inc. hostile, to the theory that earnings and profits should
be reduced by any outlays that reduce the corporation's economic
capacity to make distributions, even though this may reduce the in-
centive to comply with state or federal law.
63 § 312(f)(I). .
64 Cammarano v. United States, 246 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. gr., 355 U.S.
952; § 271.
65 See § 170(d).
66 Rev. RuI. 57-332, 1957-2 CoB. 231. But see Bernstein v. United States, 234 F.2d
475 (5th Cir. 1956): " ... it is not consistent with our ideas of proper accounting
practice for officers and directors of a corporation to be permitted to conduct the affairs
of their corporation in such a way as to defraud the government and then assert the
existence of a fraud penalty as a corporate liability, and thus translate what would
otherwise be a dividend distribution to themselves into a distribution of capita!." Al-
though the tone of these remarks implies that' the fraud penalties should never be
allowed to reduce earnings and profits, the reference to "proper accounting practice"
suggests that earnings and profits may be reduced if and when the fraud penalties are
assessed or paid.
67 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
68 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
69 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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In addition to the foregoing adjustments to taxable income, the
calculation of earnings and profits must take account of a great variety
of financial transactions that may occur only occasionally in the life
of anyone corporation.. Among these transactions, some of which are
discussed elsewhere herein, are the following:
1. The receipt by the corporation of tax-free distributions from
other corporations, such as stock dividends,70 non-dividend distributions
of cash and property,ll etc.
2. Distributions by the corporation in kind72 or of its own stock73
or obligations.74
3. Distributions by the corporation in partial liquidation or in
redemption of its stock.
4. Distributions by the corporation of the proceeds of a loan in-
sured by the United States.75
5. Mergers, consolidations, liquidations, transfers of property,
spin-offs, and other transactions by which one corporation succeeds to
the assets or tax history of another.
B. Distributions in Kind
Introductory. When a corporation distributes cash to its share-
holders, the tax consequences to both the recipient and his corporation
can be easily determined if the corporation's earnings and profits are
known. The distribution is a "dividend" to the extent of the corpo-
ration's current and accumulated post-1913 earnings and profits; the
balance, if any, is applied against and reduces the adjusted basis of
the shareholder's stock under § 301(c)(2); and any excess is subject
to § 301(c)(3). The shareholder, having received cash, has no prob-
lem of basis. As to the corporation, the distribution itself is not a
taxable event; and its earnings and profits are reduced to the extent
that the distribution is a "dividend" to the shareholders.
When we turn from a corporate distribution of cash to a distri-
bution in kind,76 however, the problems quickly proliferate. Does the
mere distribution of appreciated property create corporate income or
earnings and profits? Does the distribution of depreciated property
produce a corporate loss? If not, is a prompt sale of appreciated or
depreciated property by the distributees to be treated as a corporate
transaction, so that the gain or loss will be imputed to the corporation?
Is a distribution of property "out of" current or post-1913 earnings
and profits (and hence a "dividend") if they exceed its adjusted basis
70 Infra, p. 80.
n Supra, p. 54.
72 Infra, p. 64.
73 Infra, p. 80.
74 Infra, p. 78.
75 See § 312(j).
76 The term "distribution in kind" is used here to mean a distribution of property
other than money or the distributing corporation's own stock or obligations.
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but are less than its fair market value? Are the corporation's earnings
and profits to be reduced by the fair market value of the distributed
property, or by its adjusted basis? What is the basis of the distributed
property in the hands of the shareholders?
Before the 1954 Code was enacted, these questions engaged the
attention of the most acute commentators on the federal income tax.n
Their answers were far from unanimous, and the judicial opinions were
unusually unsatisfactory. Many of the disputed issues have been set-
tled by the 1954 Code, however, so the status of pre-1954 distributions
will be discussed hereafter only as background to the new rules.
Section 311(a)(2), enacted in 1954, provides (with three excep-
tions) that the corporation shall not recognize gain or loss on a distri-
bution in kind. This is a statutory acceptance of a pre~1954 judicial
rule; despite the Treasury's persistent contention that the distribution
of appreciated property should be treated by the corporation as a tax-
able occasion (just as though it had sold the property or used it to
discharge a debt), the lower courts uniformly held that the mere
distribution of appreciated property did not produce corporate gain or
loss. For this principle, they ordinarily cited General Utilities & Oper-
ating Co. v. Helvering.78 In fact, although the government had argued
for the recognition of taxable income upon a distribution of appreciated
property in the General Utilities & Operating Co. case,79 the Supreme
77 See generally Mintz and Plumb, Dividends in Kind-The Thunderbolts and the
New Look, 10 Tax L. Rev. 41 (1954), and their Postscript, ihid., 405 (discussing both
pre- and post-1954 law); Tritt, Corporate Distributions of Property, 1957 So. Calif.
Tax Inst. 69; Alexander, Some Earnings and Profits Aspects of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, 7 Hastings L.J. 285 (1956). For pre-1954 law, see also MOlIoy, Some
Tax Aspects of Corporate Distributions in Kind, 6 Tax Law Rev. 57 (1950); Albrecht,
"Dividends" and "Earnings or Profits," 7 ibid. 157, 207-228 (1952); Cleary, Corporate
Distributions in Kind and Sale of Property by Stockholders (Practising Law Institute,
1951); Raum, Dividends in Kind-Their Tax Aspects, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1950).
Significant early contributions were: Paul, Ascertainment of "Earnings or Profits" for
the Purpose of Determining Taxability of Corporate Distributions, in Selected Studies
in Federal Taxation (2nd Ser., 1938) 149, 167-185; Johnson, Corporation and Stock-
holder-Dividends in Kind, 1 TalC L. Rev. 86 (1945); Wallace, A Dissent, ibid. 93.
78 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See Beach Petroleum Corp., Ltd. v. ComII1issioner, U 46,192
P-H Memo TC; Molloy, supra, at 60, n.20.
79 The government's argument on this point was as follows:
... In making it [the appreciation] available to its own stockholders the corpo-
ration is realizing the appreciation, and nothing more is necessary. It is our view
that the addition to surplus on account of the increased value and the distribution
of this increased value in satisfaction of the company's general liability to its
stockholders, are the evidence that the gain has been realized, for it is incompre-
hensible how a corporation can distribute to its stockholders something which it
has not itself received. . . . It is clear that petitioner used the increased value for
a corporate purpose, and was thereby enabled to pay its stockholders $1,071,426.25.
Thus was petitioner serving the principal end for which it was organized-to earn
profits which it would distribute to its stockholders-and we submit that in so
justifying the hopes of its organizers this economic entity, called a corporation,
truly derived an economic gain. (Respondent's brief, pp. 18, 25.)
The Supreme Court refused to consider this issue, which was not raised below;
the only government argument it noticed was that the corporation's dividend resolu-
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Court did not find it necessary to pass on this issue; but even though
the question was not foreclosed by that case, the result reached by the
lower courts was endorsed, at least for the future, by the enactment
in 1954 of § 311(a)(2).
Section 311 (a) (2) is applicable, however, only if the corporation
makes a distribution of property "with respect to its stock." The
Regulations state:
Section 311 does not apply to transactions between a corporation and
a shareholder in his capacity as debtor, creditor, employee, or vendee,
where the fact that such debtor, creditor, employee, or vendee is a
shareholder is incidental to the transaction.so
See also the Senate Report on the 1954 Code,which states:
Your committee does not intend, however, through [§ 311 (a) (2)] to
alter existing law in the case of distributions of property, which has
appreciated or depreciated in value, where such distributions are made
... to shareholders in a capacity other than that of a shareholder. For
example, distribution of property made to a shareholder in his capacity
as a creditor of the distributing corporation is not within the -rule of
[§ 311(a)].81
Before 1954, there were several cases in which a corporation realized
gain or loss on the distribution of appreciated or depreciated property
to its shareholders, because the resolution authorizing the distribution
created an obligation in terms of money. In Bacon-McMillan Veneer
Co. v. Commissioner,82 for example, the dividend resolution provided
for a "fifty per cent dividend" [evidently 50 percent of the stock's
par value], "payable in Liberty Loan bonds in denominations of
$1,000.00 each, at their market value this date," with odd amounts to
be paid in cash. The court held that the corporation realized income
when it used the bonds (the value of which exceeded their adjusted
basis) to defray the indebtedness created by the dividend resolution:
The resolution provided that a 50 per cent dividend be declared. A 50
per cent dividend is a definite amount. It created an obligation of the
corporation to its stockholders. Then when that obligation was satisfied
by the distribution of the Liberty bonds owned by the [corporation],
we have a realization of a gain through disposition thereof. When the
dividend of 50 per cent was declared the. corporation could not satisfy
the legal demands of the stockholders by delivering to them bonds less
than that value. The corporation discharged its obligation to its stock-
tion created an indebtedness to the shareholders, which was satisfied by the use of
appreciated property. It has been argued that in rejecting this argument, the Court
must have assumed a fortiorari that the mere distribution of the appreciated property
was not a taxable event, but there is a big difference between answering a question
and assuming an answer in the absence of timely argument.
80 Regs. § 1.311-1 (e)(l).
81 S. Rept. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 247.
82 20 B.T.A. 556 (1930).
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holders by giving them the bonds which here had a value in excess of
the cost. We think that this is a realization of gain in every substantial
sense of the word,83
See also Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. Commissioner.84 The
status of these cases is not entirely clear under the 1954 Code. It is at
least arguable that the distribution is made to the shareholder "with
respect to his stock" (so as to invoke the non-recognition rule of
§ 311 (a», even though he is also a creditor of the corporation.85 But
it is by no means sure that the pre-1954 cases were to be overruled
by the enactment of § 311 (a), and these cases might be preserved on
the ground that it is not the distribution, but the satisfaction of the
debt, that produces gain or loss. The issue can ordinarily be avoided,
if the property has appreciated in value, by a dividend resolution re-
ferring only to the property; if there is no indebtedness measurable
in dollars, the Bacon-McMillan Veneer Co. rationale is inapplicable.86
If the property has depreciated in value, on the other hand, the corpo-
ration may find it feasible to realize a deductible loss by selling the
property and distributing only the proceeds to its shareholders.
There are three statutory exceptions to the general rule of
§ 311(a):
1. On a distribution of LIFO inventory, § 311 (b) requires the
distributing corporation to recognize gain to the extent (if any) that
the LIFO value is less than the basis determined by a non-LIFO
method. (Ordinarily this would be FIFO, although the taxpayer ap-
parently has some range of choice, since § 311 (b) (I)(A) speaks merely
of "a" method authorized by § 471.) The difference between the LIFO
and non-LIFO values is thus belatedly taken into income.
2. On a distribution of property that is subject to a liability, or in
connection with the distribution of which the shareholder assumes a
liability, § 31l(c) requires the corporation to recognize gain to the ex-
tent that the liability exceeds the adjusted basis of the property. (If the
liability is not assumed, tbe gain to be recognized by the corporation
may not exceed the excess of the value of the property over its adjusted
basis.) In effect, the distribution is treated as a sale of the property for
the amount of the liability, with the proceeds being applied to satisfy
the liability for which the corporation is now only secondarily liable.
The statute does not expressly so state, but presumably if the liability
is not paid by the shareholder or satisfied by the property by which it
83 20 B.T.A. at 559.
84 12 B.T.A. 1109 (1928) (loss on distribution of depreciated property); Mintz
and Plumb, supra, at 44, n.15, and 53-4.
85 The narrow statutory ground of Rev. RuI. 55-410, 1955-1 C.B. 297 (holding that
the satisfaction of a charitable pledge, made in a dollar amount, with appreciated or
depreciated property does not produce gain or loss), distinguishes it from the dividend
resolution cases, but its spirit is bostile to the recognition of gain or loss.
86 See Natural Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1955)
(ambiguous resolution construed as property distribution); General Utilities & Operating
Co. v. Helvering, supra.
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is secured, and if the corporation is compelled to payoff the debt, it will
have a deductible loss or bad debt.87
3. On a distribution of installment obligations, §§ 311(a) and 453(d)
require the corporation to recognize gain or loss to the extent of the
. difference between the basis of the obligation and its fair market value
at the time of distribution."
A major uncertainty in the scope of § 311 (a) was created by the
statement in the Senate Report on the 1954 Code that "your com-·
mittee does not intend to change existing law with respect to attribu-
tion of income of shareholders to their corporation as exemplified for
example in the case of Commissioner v. First State Bank of Strat-
ford.,,87a That case was concerned with the tax consquences of a dis-
tribution by. a bank to its shareholders of certain notes that it had
written off as worthless in earlier years. Despite th~ write-offs, the
notes were thought at the time of distribution to be collectible in part.
They were endorsed by the bank (without recourse) to one of its
employees, who proceeded to make collections on them as though they
were still owned by the bank, except that the proceeds were deposited
in a special account for the benefit of the shareholders. The court
held that the collections 'were income to the bank, but the basis of the
opinion is far from clear. One thought running through it is that the
bank's enjoyment of a tax benefit from writing the notes off as worth-
less carried with it an obligation to report any later recoveries as tax-
able income. But the court also suggested that the bank was taxable
on the broader theory that the distribution itself was an anticipatory
assignment of income, comparable to the gift of bond coupons in
Helvering v. Horst: 88
Even though the bank never received the money, it derived money's
worth from the disposition of the notes which it used in place of money
in procuring a satisfaction that was procurable only by the expenditure
of money or money's worth. The enjoyment of the economic benefit was
realized as completely as it would have been if the bank had collected
the notes in dollars and cents and paid the money as a dividend to its
shareholders. . .
The acquisition of profits for its shareholders was the purpose of
its creation. The collection of income on loans was a principal source
of its income. The payment of dividends to its shareholders was the
enjoyment of its income. A body corporate can be said to enjoy its in-
come in no other way. Like the "life-rendering pelican," it feeds its
shareholders upon dividends.8fI
This portion of the opinion seems to mean that the corporation must
recognize income on the distribution of any property with a value
87 See the analogous treatment of liabilities in excess of basis by § 357(c).
87a 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867.
88 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
89 168 F.2d at 1009.
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greater than its basis, at least if the shareholders thereafter sell the
property or otherwise realize income from it. Moreover, the court's
reasoning comes perilously close to the argument of the government in
the General Utilities & Operating Co. case, that a distribution of appre-
ciated property is itself a taxable realization by the corporation of the
increase in value, even if the property is not thereafter sold by the
shareholders.90
Since the Senate Report, quoted above, states that the Stratford
Bank case is only an "example" of the existing law which is left un-
disturbed by § 311 (a), we must cope with the possibility that there
are other examples of the "attribution of income of shareholders to
their corporation." The Court Holding Co. case91 is a classic example
of this doctrine; there a corporation was about to sell an appreciated
apartment house, but the corporate negotiations were called off at the
last minute in favor of a liquidation, followed by a sale of the property
by the shareholders. The Supreme Court upheld the Tax Court's
determination that the corporation was taxable on the profit from the
sale of the property, although the sale was in form made by the share-
holders:
A sale by one person [the corporation] cannot be transformed for tax
purposes into a sale by another by using the latter as a conduit through
which to pass title. . . . [T] he executed sale was in substance the sale
of the corporation.92
Nothing in § 311 (a), providing that the corporation shall not recognize
gain or loss on the "distribution" of property, undercuts the theory of
the Court Holding Co. case, under which income is attributed to the
corporation not because of the distribution, but because of a factual
determination that the sale by the shareholders "was in substance the
sale of the corporation." The Court Holding Co. doctrine has been
somewhat limited by United St<ttes 'U. Cumberland Public Ser'Uice CO.,93
but its heart is still intact, unimpaired by the enactment of § 311 (a).
Another example of pre-1954 law on the attribution of shareholder
income to the corporation is United States v. Lynch,04 requiring a cor-
poration to report income realized by its shareholders on the sale of
fruit that had been distributed to them as a dividend in kind. The
fruit was part of the corporation's inventory; a~ter the distribution,
the corporation on behalf of the shareholders proceeded to market the
fruit in its customary manner, except that it acted on behalf of the
shareholders rather than on its own account. The court said:
90 Supra, note 79.
91 324 US. 331 (1945).
92 324 U.S. at 334.
93 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
94 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952).
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The dividend in question was not the kind of a distribution contem-
plated by the statute, ... and must be ignored for tax purposes. Dis-
tribution of corporate inventory with the expectation of immediate sale
by the shareholders pointedly suggests a transaction outside the range
of normal commercially-motivated and justifiable corporate activity, yet
we have here a stronger case, because the sale was to be made by
utilizing the corporation's facilities in the ordinary course of its busi-
ness; the shareholders did not engage in a separate and independent
business in which the apples were to be used.1l5
The court i~ the Lynch case relied heavily on Commissioner v. Trans-
port Trading & Terminal Corp.,oo where the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit indicated that it might go so far as to attribute the
profit on a sale to the corporation even if there had been no corporate
negotiations or use of corporate seIling facilities and even if non-
inventory property was involved, merely because the distribution
served no non-tax function and was made in the expectation that the
distributee would sell the distributed property.
It seems likely, then, that in preserving "existing law with respect
to attribution of income of shareholders to their corporation," the 1954
Code requires the corporation to report not only the kind of income
involved in the Bank of Stratford case, i.e., the proceeds of property
with a zero basis the cost of which was previously written off with tax
benefit. The corporation can probably also be taxed under the Court
Holding Co. doctrine, where a corporate transaction is called off at
the last minute; under the Lynch case, where inventory property is
distributed and corporate facilities are thereafter employed to market
the property in the usual manner; 97 and possibly also under the Trans-
port &'1 Trading Corp. theory, where a sale by the distributee is ex-
pected and the distribution serves no non-tax purpose.98
The foregoing discussion has centered on the attribution of taxable
gain to the corporation. If the property has depreciated in value, and
is. sold by the distributees for less than its adjusted basis to the corpo-
95 192 F.2d at 720.
96 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.s. 995 (1950).
97 § 311 (b), providing that the excess of non-LIFO value over LIFO value is
taxable to the corporation at the time of distribution, does not stand in the way of
attributing income to the corporation on a later sale of the property by the share-
holders. The profit at that time would be calculated on the non-LIFO value. Since
the Senate Report refers to the "attribution of income," however, it is not clear whether
a loss could be claimed by the corporation if the sales price were less than the non-LIFO
value.
98 In the liquidation area, the Cumberland Public Service Co. case, cited in the
text, conflicts with the spirit of the Transport & Trading Corp. case, since the former
honors a liquidating distribution for the sole purpose of enabling the distributees to
sell the property. But it is less clear that the same respect would be paid to a tax-
motivated distribution by a going concern; there is a hint to this effect in the Court's
statement in Cumberland that "[t]he corporate tax is thus aimed primarily at the profits
()f a going concern." 338 U.S. at 455. Moreover, a liquidation, whatever its motivation,
has non-tax consequences that do not flow from a non-liquidating distribution.
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ration, can the corporation claim a loss on the ground that there was
"really" a sale by it? Although there appear to be no cases in point,
the Court Holding Co. case might be applied in appropriate circum-
stances, unless the courts are prepared to hold that the taxpayers
must stand by the form of their transaction even if the government
is not bound by it. Ordinarily the shareholders would seek to avoid
the issue by having the corporation sell any depreciated property in
its own name. Such a transaction in its turn might be attacked by the
government with still another variation on the Court Holding Co.
theme: if a plan to distribute depreciated property was "called off" at
the last moment after the shareholders had arranged for a sale, a
purported sale by the corporation followed by a distribution of the
proceeds might be regarded as "in substance" a distribution of the
property itself coupled with a sale by the shareholders. Viewed as a
shareholder transaction, the sale would not give rise to a deduction
by the corporation.
Taxability of distribution to individual distributees. The tax on
the recipient of a distribution in kind depends, by virtue of a 1954
change in the Internal Revenue Code, upon whether the recipient is a
corporation or an individual (including estates, trusts, and other non-
corporate taxpayers).
To take first the case of a noncorporate distributee,99 if the value
of the distributed property is fully covered by the corporation's
current or post-1913 earnings and profits,lOO the distribution is a
taxable "dividend" to the extent of its fair market value, under
§§ 301(b)(I)(A), 301(c), and 316.101 If the value of the distributed
property exceeds the corporation's current and post-1913 earnings
and profits, however, the Regulations state that the distribution is a
"dividend" only to the extent of the earnings and profits.102 The
balance would reduce the basis of the distributee's stock. under
§ 301 (c)( 2), with any excess over basis being subject to § 301 (c)(3).
The Regulations illustrate the principle that the distribution is a
99 For the taxability of corporate distributees, see infra, p. 74.
100 Supra, p. 52.
101 § 301(b) (1) (A) provides that, in the case of a noncorporate distributee, the
"amount" of a distribution in kind is its fair market value, adjusted under § 301(b) (2)
for liabilities assumed by the sh:Heholder or to which the distributed property is subject.
By virtue of § 301(b)(3), fair market value is to be determined "as of the date of the
distribution." This date may differ from the date when the distribution is includible
in gross income, according to Regs. § 1.301-1(b). (But query whether, if the date of
inclusion in gross income precedes the date of distribution and if the property increases
in value between the two dates, the higher value can be included in computing income
Ol\ the earlier date.) Note al!;o that a distrihutiol\ may hecome a "dividel\d" hy virtue
of earnings and profits arising during the taxable year but after the date of distribution.
§ 316(a) (2).
102 Regs. § 1.316-1 (a) (2).
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"dividend" only to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits
in the following way:
Example. X and V, individuals, each own one-half of the stock
of Corporation A which has earnings and profits of $10,000. Corpora-
tion A distributes property having a basis of $6,000 and a fair market
value of $16,000 to its shareholders, each shareholder receiving property
with a basis of $3,000 and with a fair market value of $8,000 in a dis-
tribution to which section 301 applies. The amount taxable to each
shareholder as a dividend under section 301 (c) is $5,000.103
The issue that is so calmly resolved by this example was heatedly
debated under both the 1939 and 1954 Codes; and the debate is not
yet over. Even a recapitulation of the debate under the 1939 Code
would be too lengthy, so we must content ourselves here with saying
that the two principal competing views were: (a) That a shareholder
could never be required to report more dividend income than his pro
rata share of the corporation's earnings and profits, as in the above
example from the 1954 Regulations; and (b) That a distribution of
appreciated property was taxable to the extent of its fair market value,
if its adjusted basis was fully covered by earnings and profits, so that
in the example given the shareholders should each recognize $8,000
of dividend income. A third, and bolder, thesis was that a distribution
was a "dividend" to the shareholders unless it impaired the corpo-
ration's capital, so that the appreciation in value of the distributed
property was taxable even if the corporation had no earnings and
profits.104 As might be expected when the views of acute commentators
are so divergent, neither side could find more than tenuous support in
the 1939 Code, and for some time the judicial decisions were meager
both in number and in persuasive power. After the House of Repre-
sentatives had passed its version of the 1954 Code, however, the Courts
of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits decided the Hirshon
Trust and Godley cases (involving different shareholders of the same
corporation) and held (under the 1939 Code) that the full fair market
value of appreciated property was taxable to the shareholders if the
corporation's earnings and profits were sufficient to cover the adjusted
103 Regs. § 1.316-1(a) (3), Example.
104 The first view was espoused by Molloy, supra, at 69-70; the second, by the
government, see Mintz and Plumb, supra, at 58-9; and the "capital impairment" theory,
by Raum, supra, at 613. A variation on the "capital impairment" theory is that the
appreciation in value does not come from either earnings and profits or capital, and is
taxable under the catch-all phraseology of § 22(a) of the 1939 Code (now, with revisions
in language, § 61 of the 1954 Code) i this argument was advanced by the government
and rejected by the court in Cloutier v. Commissioner, 24 T.e. 1006, 1015 (1955) (Acq.).
A fourth theory, wbich virtually all commentators found too bizarre for acceptance,
was that the distribution was fully taxable if the property bad been purchased "with"
earnings and profits (i.e., purchased at a time when the corporation had earnings and
profits), without regard to the earnings and profits account at the time of distribution.
See Commissioner v. Wakefield, 139 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1943).
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basis of the property.10G The theory of these cases is not free from'
doubt, but apparently the judges started with the proposition that
earnings and profits should be reduced by the adjusted basis of the
distributed property and inferred therefrom (a) that so far as the
corporation was concerned the distribution was a "dividend" in its en-
tirety if its adjusted basis was covered by earnings and profits, and
(b) that the term "dividend" should mean the same thing to the dis-
tributees as to the distributing corporation.106
The language of the 1954 Code is not quite the same as the 1939
Code, on which the Hirshon and Godley's Estate cases rest, and it has
been ingeniously argued that the 1954 changes destroy the basis of
those cases; 107 but if the draftsmen really intended a change, they
could hardly have concealed their purpose more successfully. Despite
the similarities between the two statutes, however, the House and
Senate Reports on the 1954 Code both express the view (contrary to
the result in Hirshon and Godley's Estate) that the shareholders real-
ize dividend income on the distribution of appreciated property only
to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits.10s Although
it is difficult to find a statutory basis for these committee statements/09
106 Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 861 j Commissioner v. Godley's Estate, 213 F.2d.529 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 862. The Tax Court, after exhaustively reviewing the legislative history of the
1939 Code in the light of these cases, however, adhered to its earlier view that the
distribution can be a "dividend" only to the extent of the corporation's earnings and
profits. Cloutier v. Commissioner, supra, note 104.
106 It is debatable whether the courts accepted the full-blown capital impairment
theory j it would require the appreciation in value to be taxed as a "dividend" to the
shareholders whether the corporation had earnings and protfis or Dot, and at points
both courts relied upon a construction of the statute that would permit the appreciation
to be taxed in full only if the property's adjusted basis was covered by earnings and
profits. If so, the corporation in the Hirshon Trust and Godley cases could have reduced
its shareholders' taxable income by increasing its distribution. It distributed about
$2 million in cash and property worth about $9 million when its earnings and profits
amounted to about $5.7 million. By distributing $5.7 million in cash (instead of
$2 million), the corporation could have wiped its earnings and profits account clean,
so that (on the foregoing hypothesis), a later distribution of the property would have
been a return of capital. By increasing its distribution from $11 million to $14.7 million,
then, the corporation would have reduced its shareholders' dividend income from $11 to
$5.7 million!
1Q7 Mintz and Plumb, A Postscript, supra, n.77. As they say (at 72, n.154), it is
hard "to find the change on the face of the statute, except by some close semantic
reasoning."
lOS H. Rept. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess.; p. A94; S. Rept. No. 1622, ibid., p. 248.
The Senate Report disclaims "any implication . . . with respect to the effects of
a distribution of property on earnings and profits and on the shareholders under the
1939 Code." In 1956, Congress retroactively amended the 1939 Code to provide, in
general, that a distribution of appreciated property was a "dividend" only to the
extent of earnings and profits, thus applying the 1954 rule (as set out in the regulations)
to pre-1954 years and rejecting the contrary rule of the Hirshon Trust and Godley cases.
§ 115 (n), 1939 Code.
109 The Treasury's proposed regulations adhered to the result in Hirshon and God-
ley's Estate, despite the position of the committee reports. Proposed Regs. § 316-1(a) (2)
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the statute is sufficiently ambiguous to tolerate them, and the validity
of the Regulations quoted earlier in this section, if attacked, will prob-
ably be upheld.
In the example used above,l1O the corporation's earnings and
profits exceed the adjusted basis of the property. If the earnings and
profits were only $5,000 (instead of $10,000), each shareholder would
have dividend income of only $2,500, and would treat the remaining
$5,500 of his distribution as a return of capital.
If the corporation distributes depreciated property, the governing
principles are the same: to the extent of the earnings and profits, the
fair market value of the property is a dividend; the balance, if any,
is a return of capital, subject to §§ 301 (c)( 2) and (3).
The distributee's basis for the distributed property is its fair
market value, determined as of the date of the distribution. ll1
Taxability of distribution to corporate distributees. The status
of a corporate distributee receiving a distribution in kind is compli-
cated by § 301(b)(I)(B), which provides that .the "amount" of a
distribution to such a distributee is the property's fair market value
(determined as of the time of the dis.tribution) or its. adjusted basis.
in the hands of the distributing corporation,112 whichever is the lesser.
The purpose of this restriction (applicable oIlly to corporate dis-
tributees) may be illustrated by an example. Assume that the fair
market value of the distributed property is $50,000, that its adjusted
basis in the hands of A (the distributing corporation) is $10,000, that
A has $50,000 of earnings and profits, and that A is wholly owned by
B, another corporation. Were it not for § 301(b)(I)(B), B would have
$50,000 of dividend income on receiving the property from A, but by
virtue of the 85 percent deduction for intra-corporate dividends pro-
vided by § 243(a), only $7,500 would be subject to tax. At trivial
tax cost, then, B would obtain a $50,000 basis for computing
depreciation and gain or loss on the distributed property. Section
and (3), 19 Fed. Reg. 8253 (Dec. 11, 1954). In their final form, however, the Regulations
accepted the theory of the committee reports. Regs. § 1.316-1(a)(2) and (3).
The author has elsewhere suggested that the committee reports may have been
based on a misapprehension of the Hirshon and Godley's Estate cases. Bittker, Stock
Dividends, Distributions in Kind, Redemptions and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code,
1955 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 349, 366-7.
110 Supra, p. 72.
111 § 301 (d) (1) ; see supra, note 10l.
112 The distributing corporation's adjusted basis is to be increased by any gain
recognized to it under § 311(b) (relating to certain LIFO inventory) or 311(c) (relating
to certain liabilities in e)(cess of basis), supra, p. -. It is not clear why § 301(b) (1)(B)
does not provide a similar adjustment for any gain recognized by the distributing
corporation under §§ 311 (a) and 453 (d) (relating to the distribution of installment
<lolil;atiQUs) .
If the distributee assumes any liability in connection with the distribution, or
receives the distributed property subject to any liability, tile "amount" of the distri-
bution must be reduced by virtue of § 301(b)(2).
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301(b)(1)(B) avoids this result, with its attendant possibilities for
manipulation, by providing that the "amount" of the distribution to
B is only $10,000, the property's adjusted basis to A. ll3
Having determined the "amount" of a distribution under
§ 301 (b) (l)(B), the distributee corporation must report that part
which is covered by earnings and profits as a dividend and the balance,
if any, as a return of capital subject to §§ 301(c)(2) and (3).
The corporate distributee's basis for the distributed property is
the same as the "amount" of the distribution, viz., the property's fair
market value (determined as of the time of the distribution) or its
adjusted basis in the hands of the distributing corporation, whichever
is the lesser. If the distributee carries over the basis of the distributing
corporation, it will also be entitled to "tack" that corporation's holding
period, under § 1223 (2).
If a corporation has both corporate and noncorporate share-
holders, its choice of property for distribution may affect the tax
returns of the shareholders. Assume that A Corporation owns two
parcels of property, each worth $50,000, but with adjusted bases of
$10,000 and $90,000 respectively. Assume also that A has $100,000 of
earnings and profits and is owned equally by B, another corporation,
and C, an individual. If the first parcel is distributed to B, its dividend
income and basis for the property will be $10,000. If the second parcel
is distributed to B, however, it will have dividend income, and a basis,
of $50,000. For C, the choice is immaterial; the distribution of either
parcel to him will result in dividend income, and a basis, of $50,000.
A Corporation, therefore, can benefit B by distributing either the low
or high basis property to it (depending upon whether the added tax
cost to B of receiving the high basis property is outweighed by the at-
tainment of a stepped-up basis), without prejudice to C, the individual
shareholder. The Commissioner might assert, however, that "in
reality," A distributed a 50 percent interest in each parcel to Band C,
and that Band C thereafter rearranged their interests. If the distri-
bution is "realigned" in this fashion, the taxability of the distribution
would be altered, and it is also possible that the theoretical exchange
between Band C would be a taxable event, unless it could be brought
within a non-recognition provision, such as § 1031 (a).
Distributions in kind: Effect On earnings and profits. Upon a
distribution in kind, the corporation's earnings and profits must be ad-
justed to reflect the decline in its asset position.
1. General rule. Section 312(a) states as a "general rule" that
113 Another statutory approach to this problem was in effect from 1950 to 1954;
§ 26(b) of the 1939 Code limited the dividends received credit to 85 percent of the
distributing corporation's basis for the property. See H. Rept. No. 2319, 81st Cong.,
2d sess., reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 418.
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earnings and profits shall be decreased by the adjusted basis of the dis-
tributed property. If a corporation with post-1913 accumulated earn-
ings and profits of $15,000114 distributes property with an adjusted
basis of $5,000 and a fair market value of $10,000 to Jones, its sole
stockholder, he must report dividend income in the amount of $10,000,
but the corporation's earnings and profits will be reduced by only
$5,000, leaving $10,000 of its earnings and .profits for future distri-
bution. A later distribution of $15,000 in cash, therefore, would result
in $10,000 of dividend income plus a $5,000 reduction in the basis of
Jones' stock. The tax consequences of the two distributions would be
drastically altered if their order were reversed. An initial distribution
of $15,000 in cash would constitue a dividend to Jones in the amount
of $15,000 and would wipe the corporation's earnings and profits ac-
count clean. A later distribution of the property, therefore, would not
be a "dividend" to any extent; instead, it would result in a $10,000
reduction in the basis of Jones' stock.
Timing is also critical if the distributed property is worth less
than its adjusted basis. If the adjusted basis of the distributed prop-
erty in the example iu~t outlined had been $15,000 (in~tead of $5,000),
earnings and profits would be reduced by $15,000 on a distribution of
the property, even though Jones' dividend amounted to only $10,000,
the value of the distributed property. Thus, a $10,000 "dividend" in
kind would sweep the earnings and profits account clean, so that a
later distribution of $15,000 in cash would be applied to reduce the
basis of Jones' stock, rather than taxed as a "dividend." Had the cash
been distributed before the property, however, Jones would have had
$15,000 of dividend income and a $10,000 basis reduction on the two
distributions.
2. Certain inventory assets. A special rule is provided by
§ 312(b)(l) to govern the adjustment of earnings and profits if the
corporation distributes llinventory assets)) with a fair market value
in excess of their adjusted basis. ll5 (The term "inventory assets" is
defined to mean not only stock in trade and other property properly
includible in inventory, but also property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of the corporation's trade or business
and certain "unrealized receivables or fees".) 116 On a distribution of
114 In the calculations that follow, it is assumed that the corporation has post-1913
accumulated earnings 3nd profits, agaInst which distributions are charged in chrono-
logical order, rather than earnings and profits of the taxable year, which are apportioned
among all distributions in that year. Supra, p. 55; see Regs. § 1.316-2 (b) and (c).
These Regulations, in point of fact, illustrate the method of allocation only for cash
distributions, but probably a similar method would be employed for property distri-
butions. See W. G. M3guire & Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.e. 20 (1953).
115 The RegulatioflS do not state whether fair market value is to 'be computed at
wholesale or at retail, what adjustments, if any, are to be made for anticipated selling
costs, etc.
116 § 312(b)(2).
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such "inventory assets," the corporation must (a) increase its earnings
and profits by the excess of their fair market value over their adjusted
basis, and (b) decrease earnings and profits (but not below zero) by
the fair market value of the assets.
Congress has not been willing to require the corporation to recog-
nize taxable income On the distribution of appreciated assets (except
to a limited degree),117 but on the other hand, it was not willing to give
"inventory assets" the same treatment as other property, where the
distribution produces neither taxable income nor earnings and profits.118
In effect, Congress has put "inventory assets" in an intermedi~tecate-
gory, whose distribution will produce earnings and profits but not tax-
able incomeYo This will insure that the corporation will have at least
enough earnings and profits to cover the appreciation in value, so non-
corporate distributees will always have to report at least this amount
as dividend income, unless the earnings and profits created by § 312(b)
are offset by losses. The shareholders of a corporation, therefore, will
be unable to get a "cheap" stepped-up basis for distributed "inventory
assets," even if the corporation has no earnings and profits when the
distribution is arranged; the distribution itself will create enough
earnings and profits to cover the appreciation in value, and non-
corporate shareholders will have to report dividend income pro tanto
rather than apply the entire distribution in reduction of the basis of
their stock.120
It should not be forgotten that income realized in form by the
distributees of "inventory assets" may be imputed to the corporation,
e.g., if they promptly sell the assets in accordance with a prearranged
plan or with the aid of corporate facilities. 12oa The relationship of the
earnings and profits adjustments required by § 312 (b) at the time oj
the distribution to the earnings and profits that are created by a later
sale or other disposition imputed to the corporation is not illuminated
by either the Code or the Regulations. It is surprising that the prob-
lem was left in such obscurity, since sales by the shareholders of in-
ventory property or collections by them of "unrealized receivables or
fees" would often-perhaps ordinarily-be imputed to the corporation
111 Supra, pp. 67.
118 At one time the Treasury adopted the view that earnings and profits were
created by a distribution of appreciated property of any type. See Mintz and Plumb,
supra, at 54-56.
110 In the case of LIFO inventory, both § 311 (b), supra, p. 67, and § 312 (b) may
be applicable, so that the distribution will produce (a) taxable income (and hence earn-
ings and profits) on the excess of FIFO value over LIFO value and (b) earnings and
. profits (but not taxable income) on the excess of fair market value over FIFO value.
See § 312(c)(3) ; for an illustration, see Regs. § 1.312-4, Example (3).
120 The adjustments (If ~ 312 (b) must be made whether tbe distributees are corpo-
rations or individuals, but corporate distributees are denied a stepped-Up basis by virtue
of § 301(d) (2), supra, p. 75.
120a Supra, p. 69.
HeinOnline -- 5 Howard L.J. 78 1959
78 HOWARD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5
on the principles discussed supra, .p. 68. Certainly the appreciation in
value of such assets should not be reflected in earnings and profits
more than once. Since § 312 (b) requires an adjustment to earnings and
profits at the time of the distribution, any later realization of taxable
income should affect earnings and profits only to the extent that the
appreciation has not already been taken into account.
3. Other adjustments. In addition to the foregoing adjust-
ments, earnings and profits must be adjusted under §§ 312(c)(1) and
(2) if in connection with the distribution, the shareholders assume, or
take property subject to, any liability; or if any gain is recognized to
the corporation under § 311(b) (relating to LIFO inventory) or
§ 311 (c) (relating to liabilities in excess of basis).121
Earnings and profits ought also to be adjusted in the case of
gain recognized on the distribution of installment obligations under
§ 311 (a) and § 453 (d). If such obligations constitute "inventory
assets" as that term is defined by § 312 (b)( 2) (A), as would ordinarily
be the case, the required adjustment would be made under
§ 312(b)(1).
C. Distribution of Corporation's Own Obligations
Distribution of corporation's own obligations. In lieu of distrib-
uting cash or property, the corporation may make a distribution to its
shareholders of its own obligations, ordinarily (but not necessarily)
evidenced by notes, bonds, debentures, or other securities. The Inter-
nal Revenue Code appears to assume that such a distribution will
have the same tax consequences as a distribution of other types of
property, but the Regulations depart from this assumption at certain
points in the interest of simplicity.
In the case of a noncorporate distributee, it is reasonably clear
(even though the Code is not explicit) 122 that the distribution of a
corporation's own obligations is a distribution of "property" under
§ 301 (b) (1) (A), so that the "amount" of the distribution is the fair
market value of the obligations. It follows that under §§ 301 (c) (l)
and 316 the distribution is a "dividend" to the extent of current and
post-1913 earnings and profits, and that any excess is to be treated
as a return of capital under §§ 301(c)(2) and (3). And, under
121 Supra, p. 67.
122 Both § 301(b), regarding the "amount" of a distribution, and § 301(d), pre-
scribing the basis of distributed property, speak of "property," without explicitly men-
tioning the distributing corporation's own obligations. Section 317 (a), defining "property",
is equally laconic, and the Regulations under § 317 (a) state that the term "property"
includes "indebtedness to the corporation," but say nothing about indebtedness of the
corporation. Despite these unsatisfactory gaps, a distribution of the corporation's own
obligations almost certainly is to be treated as a distribution. of "property," and the
regulations under § 301 so assume. See also § 312 (a), which explicitly includes the cor-
poration's own obligations within the term "property."
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§ 301 (d)( 1), the basis of the distributed obligations in the hands of
the distributee is their fair market value. In these respects, there is
no difference between a distribution of the corporation's own obli-
gations and a distribution of other types of property.123 It will be
recalled, however, that if the distributee is a corporation, the "amount"
of a distribution of property is the property's fair market value or its
adjusted basis in the hands of the distributing corporation, whichever
is the lesser.124 Although the Code itself does not state that a distri-
bution of the corporation's own obligations is to be treated differently,
the Regulations provide that the fair market value of the obligations
is controlling, thus confining the operation of § 301 (b)( 1)(B) to
distributions of property other than the corporation's own obliga-
tions.125 In most instances, of course, the letter of § 301 (b) (1) (B)
could not be applied to the corporation's own obligations, because
they would have no adjusted basis; but it is possible for a corporation
to issue securities and reacquire them, and in this event, they might
be regarded as having an adjusted basis that could be controlling
under § 301 (b)( 1) (B) if they were later distributed to shareholders.
Despite this possibility, the Regulations under § 301(b) ignore the
adjusted basis of the obligations.126 Similarly, § 301(d)(2) provides
that the basis to a corporate distributee of "property" is its fair market
value or its adjusted basis in the hands of the distributing corporation,
whichever is the lesser, but the Regulations confine this provision to
distributions of property other than the corporation's own obligations,
and provide that the basis of such obligations is their fair market
value.127
Although the fair market value of the corporation's obligations
controls both the "amount" of the distribution and the basis of the
obligations, as just indicated, § 312 (a) (2) provides that the distribut-
ing corporation's earnings and profits are to be reduced by the principal
amount of the obligations. In many cases, these amounts will be
identical. If the obligations are worth less than their face amount,
however, the discrepancy between the distribution's impact on the
shareholders and its effect on the distributing corporation's earnings
and profits recognizes that the corporation's assets will eventually be
reduced by the principal amount of the obligations, at least in the
normal case where they are paid in full, and that the shareholders
123 Supra, p. 54.
124 Supra, p. 74.
125 See Regs. § l.301-1(d).
126 The Regulations do not explicitly negate the significance of the adjusted basis
of the corporation's own obligations in laying down the tax consequences of a bargain
sale of "property" to a corporate distributee, Regs. § 1.301-1 (j), but the omission is
probably a mere oversight.
127 Regs. § 1.301-1 (h)(2) (i).
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(if they still hold the obligations at maturity) will recognize income
equal to the difference between the fair market value of the obligations
at distribution, which is their adjusted basis under § 301 (d), and their
principal amoune28 Perhaps it would have been theoretically more
accurate to charge earnings and profits at distribution with the fair
market value of the obligations, treating the difference between the
fair market value and the face amount as debt discount, and reducing
earnings and profits in an appropriate amount each subsequent year;
but the added complication would hardly have been worth the candle.
D . . Distributions of Stock and Stock Rights
Introductory. The provisions of the 1954 Code relating to stock
dividends129 are the outgrowth of a long history of confusion and con-
flict that cannot be ignored in the interpretation of the new statute.
The Revenue Act of 1913 said nothing about stock dividends, and an
attempt by the Treasury to tax such dividends under the catch-all
language of what is now § 61 (a), 1954 Code, was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Towne v. Eisner/30 on the ground that a stock divi-
dend did not constitute "income" as that term was used in the statute.
The Revenue Act of 1916, however, explicitly provided that a "stock
dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash value."
But in Eisner v. Macomber,131 the most celebrated case in the annals
of federal income taxation, the Supreme Court held that a distribution
of common stock by a corporation having only common stock out-
standing could not be constitutionally taxed as income to the share-
holders:
We are clear that not only does a !tock dividend really take nothing
from the property of the corporation and add nothing to that of the
shareholder, but that the antecedent accumulation of profits evidenced
thereby, while indicating that the shareholder is the richer because of
an increase of his capital, at the same time shows he has not realized or
received any income in the transaction.
It is said that a stockholder may sell the new shares acquired in
the stock dividend; and so he may, if he can find a buyer. It is equally
true that if he does sell, and in doing so realizes a profit, such profit,
like any other is income, and so far as it may have arisen since the 16th
Amendment is taxable by Congress without apportionment. The same
128 The shareholder would realize capital gain under § 1232(a) (1) if the obligation
was evidenced by a security, unless its fair market value at the time of distribution was
regarded as the "issue price" so as to bring into play the requirement of § 1232 (a) (2)
that "original issue discount" be taxed as ordinary income.
129 This portion of the text is concerned with distributions by a corporation of its
own shares, or of rights to acquire its own shares. The distribution of shares of another
corporation is treated as a distribution in kind, governed by the principles discussed
supra, p. 64.
130 245 U.S; 418 (1918).
131 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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would be true were he to sell some of his original shares at a profit. But
if a shareholder sells dividend stock, he necessarily disposes of a part
of his capital interest, just as if he should sell a part of his old stock,
either before or after the dividend. What he retains no longer entitles
him to the same proportion of future dividends as before the sale. His
part in the control of the company, likewise is diminished. Thus, if one
holding $60,000 out of a total of $100,000 of the capital stock of a
corporation should receive, in common with other stockholders, a 50 per
cent stock dividend, and should sell his part, he therby would be re-
duced from a majority to a minority stockholder, having six fifteenths
instead of six tenths of the total stock outstanding. A corresponding
and proportionate decrease in capital interest and in voting power would
befall a minority holder should he sell dividend stock; it being in the
nature of things impossible for one to dispose of any part of such an
issue without a proportionate disturbance of the distribution of the
entire capital stock, and a like diminution of the seller's comparative
voting power-that "right preservative of rights" in the control of a
corporation. Yet, without selling, the shareholder, unless possessed of
other resources, has not the wherewithal to pay an income tax upon the
dividend stock. Nothing could more clearly show that to tax a stock
dividend is to tax a capital increase, and not income, than this demon-
stration that in the nature of things it requires conversion of capital in
order to pay the tax. . ..132
Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom Mr. Justice Day concurred, dissented,
saying:
I think that the word "incomes" in the Sixteenth Amendment should be
read in "a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time
of its adoption." ... The known purpose of this Amendment was to get
rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes, and I cannot
doubt that most people not lawyers would suppose when they voted for
it that they put a question like the present to rest. I am of opinion
that the Amendment justifies the tax.1SS
Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whom Mr. Justice Clarke concurred, dis-
sented in a more elaborate opinion. The opinions in Eisner 'D. Macom-
ber have been acutely and amply criticized, and there is no need to
paraphrase here the views of the commentators.1S4
Although the constitutional theory of Eisner v. Macomber has
few defenders today, its practical importance to corporate practice
and the collection of revenue has been overemphasized. Had the case
gone the other way, stock splits would probably have been employed
132 252 U.S. at 212-13.
lSS 252 U.S. at 219-20.
134 Among many, see Powell, Stock Dividends, Direct Taxes, and the Sixteenth
Amendment, 20 Col. L. Rev. 536 (1920); Eustace Seligman, Implications and Effects of
the Stock Dividend Decision, 21 ibid. 313 (1921); E. R. A. Seligman, Studies in Public
Finance (1925) 99-123; Magill, Taxable Income (rev. ed. 1945) 31; Lowndes,. The
Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 147 (1947);
Rottschaefer, Present Taxable Status of Stock Dividends in Federal Law, 28 Minn. L.
Rev. 106 and 163 (1944).
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as a substitute for stock dividends, coupled if necessary with periodic
increases in par value or in stated capital; and if a method of taxing
stock splits had been developed, fractional shares could have been
used to serve the function of stock dividends without adverse tax
consequences.
In response to Eisner v. Macomber, Congress provided in the
Revenue Act of 1921135 that "a stock dividend shall not be subject
to tax." Immunity was thus granted by statute to all stock dividends,
whether the dividend shares were common or preferred and without
regard to the number of classes of stock outstanding, although in
Eisner 'V. Macomber the Supreme Court had passed only on a dividend
of common on common by a corporation having no other class out-
standing. The .1921 statute was silent on the question of basis, but
the Treasury's regulations required the adjusted basis of the old stock
to be allocated between the old shares and the dividend shares in
proportion to their respective market values at the time of distribution.
The Treasury's provision for an allocation of the basis of the old
shares was successfully challenged by a taxpayer in Koshland v. Hel-
veringp6 concerning a corporation having both common and non-
voting preferred stock outstanding, which distributed common stock
as a dividend on its preferred but not on its common. A preferred
shareholder asserted that she was entitled to compute the gain on a
sale of her original shares by using her full adjusted basis, without
allocating any of that basis to the common stock received as a dividend.
The Supreme Court held that when a stock dividend, unlike the one
in Eisner v. Macomber, "gives the stockholder an interest different
from that which his former stockholdings represented he receives
income." The Court then held that the failure of Congress to tax the
dividend shares on distribution did not authorize the Treasury to allo-
cate part of the basis of the old shares to the dividend shares, thus
agreeing with the taxpayer that the old shares retained their full basis
for computing gain or loss on their disposition.137
135 42 Stat. 228.
136 298 u.s. 441 (1936).
137 Besides making clear that Eisner v. Macomber did not immunize all stock
dividends from tax, the Koshland case opened up the possibility of an escape from
taxation by taxpayers who had accepted the benefit of the basis regulation by allocating
part of their original basis to the dividend shares on selling such shares; it was possible
that they could now claim the full original basis on selling the original shares. Not
long after deciding the Koshland case, the Supreme Court lIeld in Helvering v. Gowran,
302 U.S. 238 (1937), that under the 1921-36 revenue acts the basis of dividend shares
was zero, since they bad cost the shareholders nothing and were not taxed as income
on receipt. This determination opened up the possibility-the converse of the possible
escape from taxation under the Koshland case-that a taxpayer who had complied with
the invalidated regulation on selling his original shares (by allocating part of his basis
to the retained dividend shares) would have to use a zero basis on seIling the dividend
shares, and thus would not recoup his original investment tax-free. (Section 1311, which
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In response to the Koshland case, Congress provided in
§ 115(f)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1936 that:
A distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders in its stock
or in rights to acquire its stock shall not be treated as a dividend to the
extent that it does not constitute income to the stockholder within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Did this section tender the Supreme Court an opportunity to re-
examine Eisner v. Macomber or did it take that case as its starting
point? In Helvering v. Griffiths,138 a majority of the Court held that
Congress did not intend to invite a reconsideration of Eisner v. Mac-
omber; the minority saw such an invitation, however, and expressed
the view that Eisner v. Macomber should be overruled. As § 115(f)(1)
of the 1939 Code was interpreted by the majority, then, "the tax
status of a [pre-1954] stock dividend '" turns in effect on what
would have been unconstitutional under Eisner v. Macomber if Eisner
v. Macomber had been correct in its premise that a constitutional issue
is presenLm3D
Just what stock dividends could be taxed under § 115(f)(1) of
the 1939 Code, as thus construed, was veiled in obscurity. In Strass-
burger v. Commissioner,140 the Supreme Court held (by a 5-3 vote),
that a distribution of a newly created issue of non-voting cumulative
preferred stock by a corporation that had only common stock out-
standing was not taxable. All of the common .stock was owned by the
taxpayer. The Court said:
While the petitioner . . . received a dividend in preferred stock,
the distribution brought about no change whatever in his interest in
the corporation. Both before and after the event he owned exactly the
same interest in the net value of the corporation as before. At both
times he owned it all and retained all the incidents of ownership he had
enjoyed before.141
In Helvering v. Sprouse, decided at the same time as the Strass-
burger case, the Court held that a distribution of non-voting common
stock by a corporation having both voting and non-voting common
now opens up the earlier year, despite the running of the statute of limitations, in
certain cases where either the taxpayer or the government adopts inconsistent positions,
was not enacted until 1938.) But in 1939, Congress enacted § 113 (a) (19) of the 1939
Code, the predecessor of § 307 (a) of the 1954 Code, adopting the allocation rules applied
under the invalidated Treasury regulations, and also providing for situations in which
income on the sale of either the original or dividend shares had been computed in a
fashion inconsistent with the old regulations. Alvord and Biegel, Basis Provisions for
Stock Dividends under the 1939 Revenue Act, 49 Yale L.J. 841 (1940).
138 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
13D Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau and Warren, A Technical Revision of the Federal In-
come Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders, 52 Col. L. Rev. I,
9-10 (1952).
140 318 U.S. 604 (1943).
141 318 U.S. at 607.
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outstanding was also non-taxable. The non-voting common was dis-
tributed to the holders of both the voting and the non-voting common,
but the taxpayer, before the stock dividend, owned only voting common
stock. The government argued that the distribution came within the
rule of the Koshland case that "where a stock dividend gives the stock-
holders an interest different from that which his former stock holdings
represented he receives income." But the Court (5-3) held:
We think Koshland v. Helverfng : .. distinguishable. That was a
case where there were both preferred and common stockholders and
where a dividend in common was paid on the preferred. We held, in
the circumstances there disclosed, that the dividend was income but we
did not hold that any change whatsoever in the character of the shares
issued as dividends resulted in the receipt of income. On the contrary
the decision was that, to render the dividend taxable as income, there
must be a change brought about by the issue of shares as a dividend
whereby the proportional interest of the stockholder after the distribu-
tion was essentially different from his former interest.142
With the Strassburger and Sprouse cases as their guides, the
lower courts struggled with but did not solve the problem of separating
taxable stock dividends from non-taxable ones.H3 These decisions left
so much uncertainty in the taxation of stock dividends under the 1939
Code that the draftsmen of the 1954 Code essayed a new approach to
the problem. The cases just cited are of continuing importance, how-
ever, because pre~1954 law governs the basis of the original and divi-
dend shares (and the earnings and profits of the distributing corpo-
ration) if a stock dividend was distributed before June 22, 1954.144
Non-taxable stock dividends. Section 305(a) lays down the
general rule that "gross income does not include the amount of any
distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders, with respect
to the stock of such corporation, in its stock or in rights to acquire
its stock." Concerned as it is with distributions by a corporation
"with respect to [its] stock," § 305 has no effect on transfers of stock
to creditors, vendors, employees, etc., who happen to be shareholders
as well.145 Moreover, § 305 is limited to distributions of the corpo-
ration's own stock; distributions by a corporation of the stock of
another corporation are treated as distributions of money or other
142 318 U.S. at 607-8.
143 See, e.g., Tourtelot v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 901; Wiegand v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1952); Schmitt v. Com-
missioner, 208 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1954); Messer v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 264 (1953).
144 See §§ 307(c), 312(d) (2), 391, and 1052(c).
145 See § 305 (c) (3); and note the interpretations of virtually identical language
in § 301(a) and § 3H(a), found in Regs. § l.301-l(c) and § l.31l-1(e), supra, p. 49.
In Daggitt v. Commissioner, 23 T.e. 31 (1954) (Acq.L however, a distribution of stock
to shareholder-employees in payment of salary was held to be controlled by Eisner v.
Macomber; Note, Application of Eisner v. Macomber to Pro Rata Stock Distributions
in Payment of Salaries: An Opportunity for Tax Manipulation, 64 Yale L.J. 929 (1955).
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property, to which § 305 has no application. Finally, § 305 is con-
cerned with distributions of "stock" or of rights to acquire "stock."
Debt instruments are not subject to § 305. The Regulations, however,
provide that § 305 applies to treasury stock and to rights to acquire
treasury stock, as well as to unissued stock.
Although a stock dividend may be received tax-free under
§ 305(a), a sale, redemption, or other disposition of the stock may
be subject to punitive treatment if it constitutes "section 306 stock."
The special rules of § 306 apply primarily to preferred stock distrib-
uted tax-free under § 305(a) by a corporation having earnings and
profits at the time of the distribution.H6
Upon receiving a distribution of stock that is exempt from tax
under § 305 (a), the shareholder is required by § 307 (a) to allocate
the basis of the old stock between the old and the new stock under
regulations to be prescribed. Pursuant to § 307 (a), the Treasury
requires an allocation of basis in proportion to the fair market values
of the old and new stock on the date of distribution.147 The holding
period of the new stock, for determining whether capital gain or loss
on a sale or exchange is long-term or short-term, includes the period
for which the shareholders held the old stock, by virtue of § 1223(5).
The distributing corporation does not reduce its earnings and profits
when it makes a non-taxable distribution of its stock,148 and the re-
cipient, if a corporation, does not increase its earnings and profits on
receiving such a distribution.149
The statutory exceptions to the general rule of § 305 (a) are
discussed in the next section.
Taxable stock dividends. There are two exceptions to the general
rule of § 305(a) that stock dividends are receivable tax-free:
1. Optional distributions. § 305(b)(2) provides that § 305(a)
is inapplicable if the distribution is payable, at the election of any of
the shareholders, either in stock or in property. The Senate Report
on the 1954 Code states that this provision "continues the rule of the
House bill and of existing law that where a shareholder has an election
to take a dividend in stock or in cash, the election to take a stock
dividend will not prevent the stock being subject to tax.m50 The
corresponding provision of the 1939 Code, however, provided explicitly
that if any of the shareholders had such an option, "the distribution
shall constitute a taxable dividend in the hands of all shareholders,
146 For an examination of § 306, see Alexander and Landis, Bail-Outs and the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 65 Yale L.]. 909 (1956).
147 Regs. § 1.307-1.
148 § 312(d) (l)(B).
149 § 312(0(2).
150 S. Rept. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 44, 241.
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regardless of the medium in which paid.1l151 Despite the reference in
the Senate Report to "existing law," the language of the 1954 Code
does not state as clearly as did the 1939 Code that if any shareholder
has an option to take cash or other property, all shareholders realize
income. The Regulations, however, state that an option in one share-
holder is fatal to all.152 If Eisner v. Macomber is still valid, however,
it could be argued that the Constitution does not permit a shareholder _
receiving a stock dividend that would be exempt under that decision
to be taxed simply because some other shareholder has an option to
take cash or other property.Hi3
If the shareholders have an election to take money or other
property in lieu of stock, § 305 (b) (2) is applicable whether the option
is exercised before or after the distribution is declared. Plainly,
§ 305(b)(2) would become a dead letter unless it embraced options
granted to the shareholder and exercised before the declaration, as
well as those that arise and are exercised after the declaration. But
how far back of the declaration was § 305(b)(2) intended to reach? •
A proposed amendment to the Regulations, pending at this writing
(January, 1959), provides that if a corporation has two classes of
common stock outstanding, one class being entitled to dividends in
stock only while the other is entitled to dividends in cash, the share-
holder who owns shares of the former class has an option, within the
meaning of § 305 (b) (2), since in the alternative he could have pur-
chased the latter class of stock.1M If the shareholder could freely
convert one class into the other, much could be said for the theory of
the proposed regulation, but as applied to non-convertible shares, it is
rather drastic. Even if the two classes of stock are identical except
for their dividend rights, and are equal in value, the shareholder own-
ing shares entitlted to stock dividends only does not have an option
to take cash currently, except by selling the stock he now holds and
buying the other class; and neither this power nor his original decision
to buy one class rather than the other seems to be the type of "election"
to which § 305(b)(2) was intended to refer.155
2. Preferred arrears. The second exception to the nontaxability
of stock dividends is § 305 (b) (1), providing that a distribution "in
discharge of preference dividends" for the corporation's current or
151 § 115(f) (2), 1939 Code.
152 Regs. § 1.305-2 (a) .
153 See Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind, Redemptions, and Liqui-
dations under the 1954 Code, 1955 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 349, 351. See also Lester Lumber
Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 255, 261 (1950), stating that corporate law requires all
stockholders to be treated alike, so that the corporation may not offer cash to a limited
group of stockholders and require the others to accept a stock dividend.
154 21 Fed. Reg. 5104.
155 See IRS Attempts To Stop 2-Classes-of-Commoll Tax-Saving Plan; Legality
Questioned, 5 J. of Tax. 178 (1956).
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preceding taxable year shall be treated as a § 301 distribution. The
House version of the 1954 Code contained a similar exception, but it
applied more broadly to any distribution in discharge of preference
dividends, whether currently owing or in arrears. The provision as
enacted "limits the taxability to stock dividends distributed in lieu of
dividends on preferred stock which are in effect currently owing.1I156
If a distribution of stock is made to clear up arrears in preference
dividends for a number of years, the portion attributable to the earlier
years would be exempt from tax under § 305 (a); only the portion of
the distribution that is allocable to the arrears for the current and
preceding taxable years would be taxed under § 305 (b) (1). Even
this mild measure can be avoided, in appropriate circumstances, if
the arrears are cleared up by a recapitalization of the corporation.157
A constitutional issue raised by § 305 (b) (1) is not mentioned
by the Senate Report on the 1954 Code. If a corporation with common
and preferred stock outstanding, all in the hands of a single individual,
distributes additional stock to discharge preference dividends, can the
shareholder be taxed under the rule of Eisner v. Macomber? The
Strassburger case suggests, though it did not explicitly hold, that a
distribution of stock to the sole shareholder of a corporation can never
be a taxable dividend. If this is true, it may be that § 305 (b) (1)
cannot be constitutionally applied if all the stock is owned by one
shareholder or, possibly, if all classes are owned in the same propor-
tions by a number of shareholders.
The Code does not define "preference dividends" as that term
is used in § 305(b)(1). The Senate Report on the 1954 Code refers
to "dividends on preferred stock.1I158 Does this include so-called
"Class A" common stock, i.e., nonvoting stock with a dividend claim
of a fixed amount which must be paid ahead of any dividends on Class
B common and a right to participate in further dividends after a
secondary "preference" of the Class B common stock has been satis-
fied? Under § 312(b) of H.R. 8300, the House version of the 1954
Code, apparently both Class A and Class B would be "nonparticipat-
ing stock," so that a stock distribution in discharge of their preference
arrears would be taxable. The definition of "nonparticipating stock"
was dropped by the Senate, but the main thrust of its amendments in
this area was to tax only the discharge of preference dividends for
the corporation's current and preceding taxable years, whereas the
House version of the bill had taxed the discharge of all arrears. It is
possible that no other changes were intended by the Senate, and the
reference to "preference dividends" in § 305 (b) (1) can certainly be
156 S. Rept. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 44.
157 See Regs. § 1.368-2(e)(5).
158 S. Rept. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 44.
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applied to both Class A and Class B stock, to the extent of their
primary and secondary preferences. The Senate Report's reference
to "dividends on preferred stock," on the other hand, appears to
exclude the Class B stock and to leave ambiguous the status of
Class A.
When stock dividends are subject to either § 305 (b) (1) or
§ 305 (b) (2) 1 the distribution is to be treated as "a distribution of
property to which section 301 applies." Under § 301 (b), the "amount"
of the distribution is its fair market value if the distributee is an
individual; and the Regulations apply the same principle to corporate
distributees, despite the fact that § 301 (b)( 1) (B) provides that cor-
porate distributees shall use either the value of the distributed property
or its adjusted basi~ in the hands of the distributing corporation,
whichever is lower.159 Once the "amount" of the distribution is deter-
mined, it is taxable under § 301 (c)( 1) as a "dividend" to the extent
of earnings and profits; the balance, if any, is a return of capital sub-
ject to §§ 301(c)(2) and (3).160 The basis of the distributed stock
to a noncorporate distributee is fair market value under § 301 (d)( 1),
and the same should be true oi a corporate distributee, despite
§ 301(d)(2).161 The holding period of stock received in a taxable
distribution commences with the distribution; there is no provision
in § 1223 for "tacking" on the holding period of the old stock.
Stock Rights. Section 305 lumps together distributions of stock
rights and distributions of the stock itself, providing that a distri-
bution by a corporation of "rights to acquire its stock" is not includi-
pIe in the shareholder's gross income, unless (a) the distribution is
made in discharge of preference dividends for the corporation's current
or preceding taxable year, or (b) the distribution is, at the election
of any of the shareholders, payable either in stock rights or in property.
Even though § 305 does not discriminate between stock and stock
rights, however, a distribution of rights presents certain peculiar
problems.162
In the case of a nontaxable distribution of rights, basis is to be
allocated under § 307. The "general rule" prescribed by § 307 (a) and
159 Regs. § 1.301-1 (d). Ordinarily the distributing corporation would not have a
basis for its own stock, but it might distribute treasury stock. A similar use of fair
market value in measuring the "amount" of a distribution to a corporate distributee,
to the exclusion of the distributing corporation's adjusted basis, was noted supra, p. -.
Both § 317(b) and § 1032 can be cited in support of the Treasury's decision to dis-
regard basis in the case of a distribution of stock; see Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distri-
butions in Kind, Redemptions and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 1955 So. Calif.
Tax. Inst. 349, 354.
160 Supra, p. 54.
161 See supra, note 159.
162 See generaIly, Whiteside, Income Tax Consequences of Distributions of Stock
Rights to ShareholderS, 66 Yale L.]. 1016 (1957).
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the Regulations issued thereunder is an allocation of basis between
the old stock and the stock rights in proportion to their fair market
values as of the date of distribution.16s The Regulations also state
that basis is to be allocated only if the rights are exercised (in which
case the amount allocated to the rights is added to the cost of the
stock a.cquired by exercising the rights) or sold (in which case the
amount allocated to the rights is used in determining the shareholder's
gain or loss on the sale) .164 The effect of this limitation is that the
shareholder realizes no loss if he allows the rights to eJCpire without
exercise or sale.
The rule of allocation is subject to an exception. Section 307 (b)
provides that if the fair market value of the rights is less than 15 per-
cent of the fair market value of the old stock at the time of distribu-
tion, the basis of the rights shall be zero unless the shareholder
elects to allocate basis under the method of allocation provided by
§ 307(a).165 The purpose of § 307(b) is to avoid the necessity for
trifling basis adjustments on a distribution of rights of little value;
unless the shareholder elects to allocate his basis, he uses a zero basis
for the rights whether they are exercised (in which case the basis of
the new stock is its actual cost) or sold (in which case the entire
proceeds of sale will be taxable gain), leaving the basis of the old
stock intact.
If the shareholder sells his rights, § 1223(5) permits the holding
period of the underlying shares to be "tacked" on in determining the
holding period of the rights if their basis "is determined under section
307"; this embraces rights with a zero basis under § 307 (b), as well
as rights with an allocated basis under § 307 (a) .166
When a distribution of rights is taxable because the shareholders
have an option to take property instead of rights or because the distri-
bution discharges arrears in preference dividends for the corporation's
current or preceding taxable year, § 305 (b) provides that lithe distri-
bution shall be treated as a distribution of property to which section
301 applies." Under the 1939 Code, the rules relating to receipt,
exercise, sale, and lapse of taxable rights were in a state of great
confusion; and it is not entirely clear whether we are free of this
legacy. The confusion resulted from Choate v. Commissioner/67
which in turn rested upon Palmer v. Commissioner/68 holding (a) that
a distribution of rights was not taxable, even though a distribution
of the stock subject to the rights would have been taxable, in the
16S Regs. § l.307-1(b).
164 Regs. § 1.307-1.
165 The method of making an election is set out in Regs. § 1.307-2.
166 Rev. RuI. 56-572, 1956-2 C.B. 182.
167 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942).
168 302 U.S. 63 (1937).
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absence of a corporate intention to distribute earnings (ordinarily
evidenced by the existence of a substantial "spread" between option
price and fair market value of the stock at the time of distribution);
and (b) that even when such a corporate intent was manifest, income
was realized only upon exercise or sale of the rights, not upon issu-
ance.169
The pre-1954 rules for taxable rights rested on a reading of the
1939 Code, however, and it may be that they have been swept away
by the 1954 Code. Under § 305(b), stock rights are taxable only if
issued in discharge of preference dividends for the corporation's cur-
rent or preceding taxable year or if the shareholders can elect to
receive property instead of the rights; and it would not be unreason-
able to take the new statute at face value in these narrow circum-
stances: viz. J that the distribution "shall be treated as a distribution
of property to which section 301 applies," with the result that the
distribution itself would be taxable (assuming adequate earnings and
profits) to the extent of the fair market value of the rights, whether
they are subsequently sold, exercised, or allowed to lapse. On this
theory, a lapse of the rights would give rise to a deductible loss.
169 See also Gibson v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1943); Tobacco Prod-
ucts Export Corp. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 625 (1954) (N. Acq.); G.C.M. 25063,
1947-1 C.B. 45; Whiteside, supra, note 162 at 1018-22.
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